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Abstract 
 
 There has been a dangerous gap between American and Chinese perceptions of Chinese 
foreign policy, a gap contributing to acceptance of the Thucydides Trap. With the help of a 
theoretical framework and empirical evidence, this paper aims to summarize and understand the 
differences, in an effort to help overcome them and prevent a self-fulfilling prophecy. The author 
identifies five variables that shape perceptions and then categorizes Chinese foreign policy along 
several dimensions. Using the South China Sea and the Belt and Road Initiative as case studies, 
the author finds that US and Chinese interpretations of Chinese behavior along these dimensions 
are influenced by different variables. While the Chinese views are more affected by history, 
American perceptions are driven by considerations of power. The two countries understand both 
identity and norms differently, as well. By showing where the two countries' perceptions diverge, 
the author hopes to help reduce misunderstandings. The paper concludes with some practical 
recommendations along these lines. 
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Chapter 1 – A Zero Sum Game? 
The rise of China has been widely acknowledged after the 2008 Beijing Summer 
Olympics. Following the 2010 Shanghai EXPO, the major cities of China, along with the 
country, drew attention around the globe. The achievements are exemplified at both the state 
level and the individual level. At the state level, China’s economy, diplomacy, and security have 
advanced significantly. China’s overall GDP has been the second largest in the world since 
2010.1 According to some estimates, it became top foreign direct investment country in 2012 and 
has been the largest holder of U.S. sovereign debt for a long time.2 In addition to economic 
progress, China has been tied to the world more closely diplomatically as well. As of August 
2017, it had built different levels of partnership with 97 countries and regions.3 Its strategic 
relationships have covered every major region of the world. Security-wise, the People’s 
Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernization has also been expedited. Seven regional commands 
were evolved into five combat theaters; President Xi Jinping of China announced that the PLA 
would cut 300 thousand troops to condense the military apparatus in 2015; China’s first aircraft 
carrier, Liaoning, became combat ready a year later.4 At the individual level, there are also 
tremendous improvements. China’s GDP per capita increased from $184 USD in 1979 to 
																																																						
1 Justin McCurry and Julia Kollewe, "China Overtakes Japan as World's Second-largest Economy," The Guardian, 
February 14, 2011, accessed December 01, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/feb/14/china-second-
largest-economy. 
2 There is huge disparity between different methods of calculation. According to Thomas Christensen, there are 
valid sources indicating that China is the largest FDI recipient in the world. Thomas J. Christensen, The China 
Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2016), 17. 
3 "‘Major-Country Diplomacy’ Second Episode: Zhong Xing Zhi Yuan" [《大国外交》 第二集：众行致远. 新华
网], accessed October 30, 2017. http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2017-08/29/c_1121565906.htm. 
4 "Reform of China's Army Enters a New Phase," The Economist, August 03, 2017, accessed November 19, 2017, 
https://www.economist.com/news/china/21725812-overhaul-says-lot-about-xi-jinpings-governing-style-reform-
chinas-army-enters-new-phase; "How Does China's First Aircraft Carrier Stack Up? | China Power Project," Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, August 09, 2017, accessed November 22, 2017, 
https://chinapower.csis.org/aircraft-carrier/. 
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$8123.2 USD in 2016.5 Life expectancy of Chinese at birth prolonged for about 10 years during 
the same period.6 The number of Chinese tourists abroad reached a new high of 135 million in 
2017.7 Having a huge population abroad, the Chinese government has been increasingly capable 
of protecting its citizens. In 2015, when Yemen's government fell into crisis with the Houthi 
rebels, the Chinese government sent its convoy to evacuate almost 600 Chinese citizens stranded 
there.8 Another 225 foreign nationals were picked up upon foreign governments’ request. As 
Princeton University Professor Thomas Christensen contends, the rise of China in all dimensions 
is real.9 
The rise of China has unsettled many scholars around the world, most notably in the U.S. 
As Harvard Professor Graham Allison argues, the rise of China presents the world a new 
challenge, that of Thucydides’ Trap: 
 
Thucydides’ Trap refers to the natural, inevitable discombobulation that occurs when a 
rising power threatens to displace a ruling power. This can happen in any sphere. But its 
implications are most dangerous in international affairs… Today it has set the world’s 
two biggest powers [the United States and China] on a path to a cataclysm nobody wants, 
but which they may prove unable to avoid.10  
 
According to Allison, the Thucydides’ Trap has an impressive predictive power. In the 16 cases 
he studied where rising powers posed strategic challenges to existing powers in the last 500 
																																																						
5 "GDP per Capita (current US$)," The World Bank, accessed December 01, 2017, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. 
6 Although life expectancy increased significantly from 1965 to 1979, the disastrous Great Leap Forward and 
Cultural Revolution were the culprits for the significant loss of life during those years. That should not be compared 
with natural increase in life expectancy. "Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (years)," The World Bank, accessed 
December 01, 2017, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN. 
7 Zigor Aldama, "How Surge in Mainland Chinese Tourists Is Changing the World," South China Morning Post, 
October 17, 2017, accessed April 18, 2018, http://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-
reads/article/2113116/how-chinese-tourists-are-changing-world.  
8 "Yemen Crisis: China Evacuates Citizens and Foreigners from Aden," BBC News, April 03, 2015, accessed 
November 23, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32173811. 
9 Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, 13. 
10 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), xvi. 
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years, 12 of them ended up with military conflicts.11 This is not a comfortable ratio. Now as 
China becomes stronger in all dimensions, the current global hegemon, the United States, 
worries about China’s rise—just as the U.S. worried about the rise of West Germany and Japan 
in the 1980s. However, China’s growth has not been slowed by any serious challenges like the 
reunification of Germany or the crash of the Japanese yen that stalled those countries’ quick 
approach to match the capacity of the United States. The structural conflict, with China’s 
continuous rise, puts increasing pressure on the current global hegemon, the United States.  
 From Allison’s perspective, the worry arises with a reason. The continuing rise of China 
seems to push China and the U.S. into the uncomfortable Thucydides’ Trap. The “China threat” 
argument has permeated U.S. government and scholarly discussions, and the public imagination. 
Classic realism assumes that capability shapes intention.12 As China gets stronger all around, 
realists assume that China will increase its influence in many spheres: maximizing territory, 
shaping the behaviors of foreign countries, and allocating the global division of labor.13 From the 
most imminent to the most distant, increasing Chinese capabilities will gradually dwarf the 
comparative advantages the U.S. has enjoyed. With the structural conflict in mind, as China’s 
power expands in all dimensions, areas of conflicts of interests also expand. For America, the 
increasing feeling of threat seems legitimate under a zero-sum assumption. Nonetheless, the 
Thucydides’ Trap cannot avoid the criticism that it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. The more the 
U.S. deems China’s rise as an aggression, the more insecure it is. America’s insecurity will 
naturally lead to its countermeasures to ensure its strategic advantage, which will put China in a 
																																																						
11 Ibid, 42. 
12 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of Americas World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 5. 
13 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 23-25. 
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position of improving its defense. This vicious spiral effect will push China and the U.S. closer 
and closer to war. 
U.S. politicians and scholars certainly understand this danger. As Raymond Cohen 
argues, “Threat perception is the decisive intervening variable between action and reaction in the 
international crisis.”14 However, rational responses based on realistic threat assessments are more 
easily prescribed than achieved, not least because American perceptions of Chinese foreign 
policy are different from the Chinese perceptions. In most cases, the U.S. government claims that 
Chinese actions disrupt the global system or regional stability, whereas the Chinese government 
considers them benign or neutral. For instance, when Chinese officials sketch the future of the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), they often highlight its economic benefits to “[enhance] 
connectivity and [unlock] Eurasia’s economic potential.”15 On the contrary, western scholars 
usually stress BRI’s strategic implications to create an alternative regional financial system, and 
counter America’s rebalance to Asia policy by changing its focus to the Eurasian landmass.16   
 At face value, it seems that the divergent interpretations of BRI are grounded in different 
assumptions. The American perception stems from realist assumptions; the Chinese perception 
comes from a liberal perspective. Nonetheless, the differences in the two perceptions may be due 
to either intentional or unintentional misrepresentation. Failing to identify the root of the 
competing representations of China’s intentions could result in even more deterioration in U.S.-
China relations. Misperception could be wholly unintentional, as American experts who believe 
in the structural threat would feel increasingly threatened because of an increasing Chinese naval 
																																																						
14 Raymond Cohen, "Threat Perception in International Crisis," Political Science Quarterly 93, no. 1 (1978): 93, 
doi:10.2307/2149052. 
15 Nadège Rolland, Chinas Eurasian Century?: Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road 
Initiative (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017), 109. 
16 Rolland, Chinas Eurasian Century?: Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative, 116 
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presence to safeguard Chinese investment abroad. Yet, it is also possible that the 
misrepresentation is intentional, as the American government tries to earn strategic advantages 
by manipulating the rhetoric of threat perception to influence Chinese policy. 
Different perceptions or misperceptions have always existed, but the serious implications 
of such differences between two world powers make it incumbent upon us that we do what we 
can do to avoid the Thucydides’ Trap. Otherwise, misperceptions, plus assumptions of a zero-
sum structural challenge, could significantly degenerate the stability of the U.S.-China relations, 
and regional or even global peace. In the case of BRI, for example, America would question 
whether the Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are prioritized in BRI projects, and thus 
displacing American firms in the region.17 Consequently, the American government might seek 
to minimize the China challenge to itself by delaying or disrupting the full implementation of 
China’s objectives. From the Chinese perspective, such actions would be extremely dangerous 
for China’s objectives and the success of BRI. The Chinese government would likely implement 
countermeasures. This vicious cycle would make the Thucydides’ Trap unavoidable. 
BRI is only one of many examples where America and China appear to interpret China’s 
actions differently. Its financing engine, the recently-established Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB), is open to similar discrepancies in interpretation. And conflictual perceptions go 
well beyond the economic and financial sector. Security-wise, China’s recent moves in the South 
China Sea, its military modernization, and the construction of its first military supply base in 
Djibouti all contribute to the same tensions. And, in the diplomatic field, as China assumes a 
larger role in global governance and participates more actively in multilateral institutions, the 
																																																						
17 Joshua P. Meltzer, "China's One Belt One Road Initiative: A View from the United States," Brookings, June 28, 
2017, accessed November 30, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative-a-
view-from-the-united-states/. 
  9 
U.S. likewise perceives a threat to its authority. The U.S. has summarized these behaviors as 
expansionist, accusing China of disturbing the existing international order. In contrast, China 
claims that its behaviors are legitimate and well within international norms, not to mention 
defensive in essence. With China’s all around rise, misconceptions seem to permeate and 
reinforce the potential structural conflict between the two countries. 
For any international observer of the great power dynamics, conflict avoidance is 
definitely a central field of focus. To search for answers, we must clearly identify where the 
problems lie. As discussed above, we must determine whether China and the U.S. truly hold 
different assumptions about Chinese foreign policy, where the difference in their perceptions lie, 
whether there exists any misperception, and, if there is, whether the misrepresentation is 
intentional or unintentional. The rest of the paper will focus on addressing the problem of 
perception and misperception of the Chinese foreign policy. Once we can identify what dictates 
American and Chinese perceptions, we can offer aspirational policy recommendations to 
improve U.S.-China relations. We can ensure that no misjudgment will amplify the structural 
conflict between China and America, and thus reduce the chance of undesirable outcomes of 
Thucydides’ Trap. But more important, these policy recommendations could help build 
confidence, improve bilateral relations, and even achieve a positive sum result. 
The second chapter introduces the theoretical background of perception and 
misperception in international politics, especially that of threat perception. Threat perception 
consists of two stages: observation and appraisal. In this theory chapter we mainly focus on the 
appraisal parts: how do countries consolidate their perceptions of Chinese foreign policy? 
Traditional security scholars would focus on two factors: capacity and intention. Our theoretical 
framework, based on up-to-date threat perception theories, will enlist five variables that 
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influence perceptions through either capacity or intention, or both. The five variables are rooted 
in disparities and changes in power, similarity and difference in identity, the change in norms or 
rules, historical experience, and (lack of) information. In the appraisal process, misperceptions 
happen frequently. Based on current literature, several heuristic filters are introduced that will 
later help us identify whether any misperception of either American or Chinese perceptions 
exists. The heuristic filters include security dilemma, status dilemma, centralization, 
overestimation of one’s importance, the influence of desires and fears, and cognitive dissonance. 
Understanding the pattern of perceptions and misperceptions can help us assess the accuracy of 
American and Chinese perceptions.  
The third chapter will be the model chapter, establishing the empirical evidence for 
analysis. The chapter is aimed at comparing and contrasting the specific Chinese actions in 
foreign policy, the American perception, and the Chinese perception. The first half of the chapter 
sets the tone, by giving the background of how China has climbed up the ladder of the global 
community, and what China and the U.S. think of China’s rising. In the second half, the main 
comparative framework is laid out, comparing objective observations, the American perception, 
and the Chinese perception along the dimensions of China’s bilateral relations, multilateral 
diplomacy, security, and economic engagement. In each dimension, the three views are 
systematically compared. The model not only aims to show the key differences between the 
American and Chinese perceptions of Chinese foreign policy, but also compares both 
perceptions with the objective narration. The former helps one to understand how the two nations 
understand the same incidents differently, thus showing the amount of disagreement between 
both nations. The latter contributes to understanding the accuracy of both perceptions, therefore 
discerning biases of both perceptions (either against or in favor of China). This chapter will lay 
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bare key differences that will be the empirical foundation of final analysis and aspirational policy 
prescriptions.  
The fourth and fifth chapters will be devoted two cases studies: one on the South China 
Sea, and the other on the Belt and Road Initiative, both of which are in accordance with the three 
criteria of the observation stage of the perception theory. The reasons for presenting these two 
mini-studies are twofold. First, both cases are important in Chinese foreign policy and speak to 
several dimensions of foreign policy. Second, through the mini-studies, the model developed in 
Chapter Three can be applied and used to derive policy recommendations. These detailed 
accounts will contribute to specific measures to foster a better understanding of Chinese foreign 
policy for the U.S., as well as a better understanding of each other’s perception between the two 
nations.  
In the last chapter, the theoretical and empirical evidence drawn from Chapters 2 and 3 
are combined, shedding light on the variables that dictate American and Chinese perceptions. 
The overall analysis will help answer several questions emerged in the introduction: Is American 
perception of Chinese foreign policy accurate? How threatening is China to the U.S.? Does the 
U.S. or China misperceive what China has been doing? Are misrepresentations intentional or 
unintentional? How have these perceptions and misperceptions changed the calculation of both 
nations? In short, what can China and the U.S. can do to improve bilateral relations and avoid the 
zero-sum fate of Thucydides’ Trap? 
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Chapter 2 – Laying the Theoretical Ground 
 Chapter 1 briefly introduced the case wherein America and China interpret the flagship of 
Chinese foreign policy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), vastly differently. The Chinese 
government champions its creation as part of the regime’s support for globalization, claiming 
that it will help connect the Eurasian landmass. In contrast, the American government pays the 
most attention to how BRI may provide China with strategic advantages over the U.S. and its 
allies, including justification for setting up a military base in Djibouti next to America’s. The 
U.S. perceives China’s allegedly benign initiatives as threats to American interests. Unfriendly 
reactions follow opposing interpretations: The U.S. government has overtly and covertly 
impeded its European allies from jumping on the bandwagon of Chinese economic integration 
and has criticized Chinese security and military actions for destabilizing Asia. Additionally, the 
disparities between Beijing’s and Washington’s perceptions is apparent across a range of foreign 
policies. China and the U.S. have dissimilar or totally distinct views on China’s military buildup 
in the South China Sea, its restrained attitude towards denuclearization in North Korea, the 
Liaoning aircraft carrier’s voyage to Western Pacific, and many other activities that China 
perceives as legitimate and defensive whereas the U.S. perceives them as threatening and 
expansionist. U.S.-China interactions are thus consistent with Raymond Cohen’s previously 
mentioned observation: “Threat perception is the decisive intervening variable between action 
and reaction in international [politics].”18 In order to analyze whether American and Chinese 
perceptions—and representations—of Chinese foreign policy are accurate, this chapter will 
introduce perception theories to provide a theoretical platform through which empirical evidence 
can be examined. By drawing from different authors, this chapter will present a two-stage 
																																																						
18 Cohen, "Threat Perception in International Crisis," 94. 
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framework where threat perceptions are determined by the influence of five major variables on 
the perception of capability and intention. 
 
(Theoretical Framework Graph) 
 
 
According to Raymond Cohen, the perception of threat involves two stages.19 The first 
stage is observation, when cues are received by people. Cues can be verbal or nonverbal, from 
presidential statements or newspaper articles, to military dispatches or withdrawal of 
ambassadors. The receiver’s selection of cues depends on three central criteria: geography, the 
“present state of affairs”, and sense of vulnerability. Observers interpret and try to rationalize the 
events happening around them every day. Geographical criterion means that when certain events 
happen in places with “immense strategic, historic, and sentimental importance,” observers are 
																																																						
19 Ibid, 95. 
Threat
Perception
Observation
Appraisal
Capacity
Intention
Geography
“Present State of Affairs”
Vulnerability
Power
History
Information
Rules/Norms
Identity
Two Stages Two Factors Five Variables Heuristic Filters for
Misperceptions
1. Status Dilemma
2. Security Dilemma
3. Centralization
4. Overestimation of
One’s Importance
5. Influence of Fears
and Desires
6. Cognitive Dissonance
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more likely to pick up on the cues.20 The “present state of affairs” criterion refers to the fact that 
perceivers are apt to be drawn to events with ongoing mistrust and tension.21 A sense of 
vulnerability means that there are certain areas in which observers perceive stronger threats from 
opponents than others.22  
These criteria dominate which cues are perceived. Thus, the nationalization of 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands by the Japanese government in 2014, Tsai Ing-wen’s election in Taiwan 
in 2016, the international tribunal ruling over the South China Sea dispute in 2016, and the 
Donglang/Doklam standoff near the China-India border in 2017 each touched a sensitive nerve 
for Beijing. Similarly, as previously mentioned, China’s military buildup in the South China Sea, 
its restrained attitude towards denuclearization in North Korea, and the Liaoning aircraft carrier’s 
voyage to Western Pacific all make the U.S. anxious.  
The second stage of threat perception, as explained by Cohen, is appraisal, wherein 
people evaluate whether they are threatened or not. For the purposes of this paper, the center 
analysis of both the American and Chinese perceptions will be built around the appraisal stage. 
Complementary to Cohen is Janice G. Stein’s work, in which she argues that threat perception is 
a function of two factors, capacity and intention.23 Capacity determines whether one actor has the 
ability to attack another, and intention represents whether one actor wants to attack another, but 
what’s at stake is the interplay between the variables. When one country possesses the intention 
but not the capacity to harm another, it is usually seen as a bluff. If the supreme leader of North 
Korea claimed it was about to launch a nuclear attack against its alleged enemies in the 1990s, 
																																																						
20 Ibid, 96. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Janice Gross Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations," Oxford Handbooks Online, 2013, 2, 
doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199760107.013.0012. 
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his provocation would more likely have been seen as verbal aggression. When one country has 
capacity, but not the intention, to attack another, different theoretical schools of thought diverge 
on the outcome. Classical realists who assume “capability shapes intention” would perceive a 
country with capacity as threatening. In comparison, liberals who focus more on analyzing the 
interests of actors and institutional influence, and constructivists who care more about self-
conception and its offshoot self-fulfilling prophecies, argue that capacity is not the only factor of 
threat perception.24 Nonetheless, when both factors are present in a country’s behavior, all 
schools agree that threat perception reaches its apex.  
Capacity and intention are broad and lack enough nuances. Thus, it is worthwhile to 
consider the relevant variables introduced by realist, liberal and constructivist schools of thought, 
since these can permeate countries’ perceptions of other countries’ policies, as policymakers in 
each country have diverse backgrounds and assumptions. As mentioned above, based on the 
current literature, there are five explanatory variables influencing threat perception through their 
influence over a country’s capacity, intention, or both: the variables are rooted in disparities in 
power and changes in relative power, identity, and the change in rules or norms, historical 
experiences, and (lack of) information. Academics have offered explanations of threat perception 
that rely on each of these as the filter between observation and appraisal. Each of these 
contributes to perceptions of threat that are more or less consistent with reality. However, some 
empirical evidence has shown us a lack of full alignment between perceptions and reality, thus, 
in addition to the perceptions rooted in the five variables, there is also intentional signaling and 
misrepresentation mucking up the works. On the one hand, threats are often manipulated as a 
means of deterrence and defense; intentional misrepresentation may serve some signaling 
																																																						
24 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2017), xxvii; Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of Americas World Role, 18. 
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functions, and thus, it is hard to change if a country deems this strategy useful. On the other 
hand, misperceptions do exist, and they should be corrected to reduce the communication 
failures between countries and protect bilateral relations. After describing each of the five 
variables below, they will be examined for misperceptions using several heuristic filters. These 
filters include the security dilemma, status dilemma, centralization, overestimation of one’s 
importance, the influence of fears and desires, and cognitive dissonance.  
 The first major variable is power and its change in relation to that of other countries.25 
The power variable influence the level of threat perception through its impact on the capacity 
factor. Power is a relative concept. As a relative concept, one country’s power can either force or 
persuade another country to act in the interest of the former. As argued by David L. Rousseau 
and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, “the perception of threat in intergroup conflict is a function of 
power asymmetries between groups.”26 When the latter country feels its position given certain 
issues has changed, its original goals have reset, or its preferences have been shaped even 
without much resistance, it feels the coercion and perceives whoever exerts this power as 
threatening. A classic example demonstrating how power determines threat perception would be 
the dynamics between American and Chinese military forces right after the foundation of the 
current People’s Republic. When the Communist Party tried to defeat the fled Kuomintang in 
Taiwan in 1950, Washington decided to intervene for the interests of the capitalist bloc after 
taking into account the outbreak of the Korean War. With the introduction of the seventh fleet, 
the disadvantaged People’s Liberation Army was not able to cross the Taiwan Strait. Originally 
set to reunify Taiwan immediately, China gave up its goal of reunification as China saw that the 
																																																						
25 David L. Rousseau and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, "Identity, Power, and Threat Perception," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 51, no. 5 (2007): 744, doi:10.1177/0022002707304813. 
26 Ibid, 744-746. 
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military power asymmetry between the U.S. and China was threatening to the Beijing 
government.  
 The power influence of threat perception is a reciprocal idea. The disappearance of power 
advantage generates the same feeling of a threat as the appearance or the use of power, and the 
unease now falls to the other side. When the weaker country becomes stronger, the existing 
greater power often realizes that their original power projection does not function in the same 
way as before. When a shift in the power dynamics between two countries sends the stronger 
country a signal that the weaker country has the momentum to overcome the originally stronger 
country, the stronger country is afraid of losing its superior power and considers the weaker 
country dangerous because it now challenges the existing regional or global leadership. In other 
words, the loss of relative advantage in terms of power, as well as the loss of hegemony, is itself 
upsetting. Consider the last example. When the seventh fleet was stationed in the Taiwan Strait 
in the 1950s, China could not harm any American battleship, let alone achieve unification. 
Presently, however, Chinese missiles are deployed along the coastline in Fujian, which is the part 
of the mainland right next to Taiwan, and are combat-ready to challenge perceived threatening 
actors. Although not directly endangering U.S. homeland security, decision-makers in 
Washington need to consider the risk of Chinese retaliation if they decide to intervene in another 
Taiwan Strait crisis. Furthermore, China’s capability to retaliate through bilateral economic 
interdependence means that the repercussions from another intervention could go beyond 
military reaction. The joint aftermath translates into an effective deterrence that challenges 
American hegemony. The reciprocal characteristic of the power variable, thus, signifies that both 
expansion and contraction of a relative power gap can lead to threat perception. Although all 
schools of threat perception theory believe power matters, realist theorists often highlight the 
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predominant influence of power. For realists, a change in capacity by itself is significant enough, 
since an increase in power means an increase in the likelihood of aggressive intention. 
However, constructivists such as Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero identified another 
variable—identity. Unlike the realist framework where power represents intention, the 
constructivist framework believes that identity, an explanatory variable independent of power, 
speaks to the intention factor of threat perception separately. Both social identity theory and self-
categorization theory underscore the distinction between “us” and “them,” stressing the boundary 
between “the ingroup and the outgroup.”27 This “us” versus “them” mentality is often built by 
fundamental characteristics of the institution and society, such as regime type, economic 
structure, and demographics.28 Constructivists believe that “a shared sense of identity can reduce 
perceptions of intergroup threat.”29 So, the more similar two countries are, the less likely the two 
perceive each other as a threat. For example, through a comparison between the U.S. and Japan, 
David Rousseau explains that the two countries’ identities are similar because they are both 
capitalist democracies, even though Japan is a nation-state and the U.S. is not. Their similarity 
predicts their close relations. In the case of China and the U.S., the two differ in most ways. 
China is a one-party authoritarian nation-state with a population comprised of more than 90 
percent ethnic Han people. It champions state intervention in political, economic, societal and 
civil issues. In comparison, the U.S. is a bicameral federal capitalist democracy whose citizens 
come from diverse backgrounds. In international politics, the U.S. helped establish the post-
WWII global order and has been the vested interest since then. China, on the other hand, is not 
among the traditional Western powers, and as a result, it hopes to modify the international 
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system in its favor. From this comparison, Beijing and Washington should have much less shared 
identity than that between Washington and Tokyo. 
Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero argue that the power and identity variables do not merely 
produce an additive result. They find an interactive or multiplicative relationship between the 
two. Their experimental study has found a positive and statistically significant value for the 
interactive variable he creates. “Specific combinations of power and identity produced an 
increase in threat perception more than the simply additive impact of each independent 
variable.”30 That means that, if the U.S. sees that China becomes increasingly powerful and that 
the identity disparity between China and itself is huge, the U.S. should feel much more 
threatened by China than the effect of only having either power increase or identity disparity. 
The constructivist multiplication effect, thus, can render stronger threat perception than what is 
likely under a realist paradigm under the same circumstance. 
The third variable of threat perception, borrowing from Raymond Cohen’s threat 
perception framework, is the discomfort that comes when one country changes the rules of the 
game or does not abide by commonly-held norms, an argument that is consistent with the liberal 
focus of interests and institutions. Rules and norms define what a country can and cannot do 
given the current institutional framework either regionally or globally. The institutional 
framework can take explicit forms such as international laws or bilateral agreements, or implicit 
forms like traditions or tacit agreements. Whichever form they take, rules and norms function as 
a communication tool among state actors and coordinate each other’s behavior.31 In the practical 
world where coordination costs are high, countries abide by previously agreed-upon rules in 
order to manage their expectations of one another’s actions. Even for countries whose power and 
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identity variables indicate that they have totally opposite interests, rules and norms ensure that 
they can maintain a peaceful coexistence. But when the norms or rules are broken, each 
country’s expectation of the other has been distorted because countries do not know what to 
expect from others, and thus, they have to prepare for the worst outcome. Mutual trust falls 
because rules and norms that serve as constraints to all parties are missing, and threat perception 
heightens accordingly. During the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and the United States both 
had enormous power and shared no similarity in identity, the two could maintain peace largely 
thanks to the negotiated post-World War II order that resulted from the Yalta Conference. 
Although major parties involved were not happy about the concessions they had to make during 
negotiations, they nevertheless reached a balance that all parties agreed to. However, the Cuban 
Missile Crisis is an example of defection to the expectation of each other. No longer constrained 
by previous norms of avoiding the use of nuclear weapons, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
had to prepare for the worst, the precipitation of a potential nuclear-level confrontation. 
Fortunately, Gorbachev backtracked and honored the tacit agreement of the existing division of 
spheres of influence again. He communicated his re-addiction to the old rules successfully to 
Washington by shipping the nuclear weapons back to Moscow. 
The change in rules and norms is often expressed through trespasses of existing rules or 
norms by a country. Unlike power and identity which are more objective, a change in rules or 
norms could be intentional or unintentional. When a country becomes increasingly powerful, it 
may give rise to distortion in its behaviors that violate some rules or norms. In this case, the 
change or violation is unintentional. Nonetheless, changing behaviors does not require a change 
in power or identity. By no longer abiding by certain rules or norms, countries often tend to 
signal others through their uncommon actions. When acting alone, a change in rules or norms 
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signals changes in a country’s intention. From a pragmatic theoretical perspective, this variable 
should matter more as a policy tool in reducing tensions between the U.S. and China. Given the 
fact that the power gap between China and the U.S. has narrowed, and the disparity in their 
identities are huge, both the U.S. and China should be careful in their foreign policy. Similar to 
the case between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the expectation of each other will drop 
significantly if one or the other fails to abide by existing rules or norms. Consequently, it is 
important for each to manage the threat perception of the other through clearly following rules 
and norms. The change in rules or norms should be an important variable over which both 
countries should have more control. 
The fourth variable that influences threat perception is history. As Robert Jervis argues, 
people learn from history and form a picture based on what they learn because, “by making 
accessible insights derived from previous events, analogies provide a useful shortcut to 
rationality.”32 In a rapidly changing world, central decision-makers need to filter noises in order 
to make judgments quickly. Cognitive consistency facilitates the consolidation of historical 
images despite limited cases studied, as “we tend to believe that countries we like do things we 
like, support goals we favor, and oppose countries that we oppose; [and] we tend to think that 
countries that our enemies make proposals that would harm us, work against the interests of our 
friends, and aid our opponents.”33 History shapes how people think, even when enough nuances 
are presented. Long-standing hostility between France and Germany between the eighteenth and 
twentieth centuries demonstrates how historical memory increases the perception of aggression 
between countries, despite the constant evolution of relations between those countries. 
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History influences threat perceptions not only through shaping people’s thought 
processes but also by serving as a comparison between the past and the present. Through this 
latter form, the history variable interacts and even amplifies with the effects of power and the 
change in rules or norms variables. Decision-makers may compare the past and the present level 
of power. The interaction between the history variable and the change of rules or norms variable 
would derive decision-makers’ expectation to foreign countries’ future behaviors. Both 
comparison and expectation require a historical perspective of threat perception, which could 
significant influence one’s perception of others. In sum, history highly correlates with other 
variables and influences threat perception by itself as well as by its interacting with other 
variables. Sino-Japanese relations is a classic example of when history had a huge impact on 
threat perception. During “the century of humiliation,” China first was defeated by Japan in the 
First Sino-Japanese war during 1894 to 1895. Since then, Japan has controlled a huge part of 
China during the first half of 20th century, including most famously, Manchuria. By leaving 
China a narrative of victimhood, China has been always highly alerted by any improvement of 
the Japanese military. Even today, whenever Shinzo Abe, the Japanese Prime Minister, pushes 
for pacifist constitution reform, China is extremely vocal and worries about the rise of revisionist 
power in Japan. Similarly, China’s predominance over Japan during the medieval period made 
Japan extremely worried about China as China became stronger. Taking this all into account, 
historical interaction renders China and Japan with deep mistrust. Threat perception of each other 
based on the historical experience, as a result, is high. 
The fifth and last variable of threat perception is information, or the lack of it. 
Information is important for estimating the capacity and intention of state actors. Rationalist 
accounts believe that incomplete information creates uncertainty, which leads to the rise of threat 
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perception. Some countries have incentives to hide information because they are afraid of an 
exhibition of weakness or a revelation of true intentions. Saddam Hussein was required by UN 
Resolution 687 to dismantle all his weapons of mass destruction. He carried out the Resolution 
as instructed, but he did not want to appear soft in front of Iran. So, he intentionally bluffed his 
neighbor at the international stage. Similarly, North Korea previously had incentives to hide its 
real nuclear capability, hoping that the U.S. could be deterred by its nuclear tests. In both cases, 
information was manipulated in order to achieve strategic ends. However, a lack of information 
heightens threat perception; deliberate misrepresentation, unfortunately, often results in the 
opposite result.  
The five variables discussed above determine threat perception through affecting either 
the perception of a country’s capacity, that of its intention, or both. Then, I am going to introduce 
common errors of perceptions based on the study of Janice G. Stein and Robert Jervis. These will 
serve as heuristic filters to examine the empirical evidences provided in the following chapters. 
The first heuristic filter for misperception, introduced by Stein, is the status dilemma. A status 
dilemma presents a scenario in which “two countries would be satisfied with their status if they 
had perfect information about each other’s belief.”34 Because of incomplete information and 
uncertainty felt by the observer, the observer perceives a larger threat and prefers to take 
measures to protect itself. Stein further argues that a status dilemma often leads to the second 
common error, the security dilemma. A security dilemma happens when both countries are 
security seekers: when country A decides to take on defensive measures to safeguard its 
interests, country B finds A’s defensive measures disturbing and takes on more.35 A spiral effect 
of the security dilemma will then make both countries more insecure. Note, while the status 
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dilemma is solely associated with the information variable, the spiraling security dilemma can be 
applied to other variables as well, especially the power variable. The arms race of the Cold War 
is an example of the security dilemma. 
In addition to Stein’s status and security dilemmas, Robert Jervis also notes four common 
misperceptions. They are centralization, overestimation of one’s importance, the influence of 
desires and fears, and cognitive dissonance. According to Jervis, Centralization refers to the 
misperception that one country will understand the “behavior of others as more centralized, 
planned, and coordinated than it is. This is a manifestation of the drive to squeeze complex and  
unrelated events into a coherent pattern.”36 Because decision-makers tend to overestimate how 
much foreign counterparts know about them and their government, they would more likely 
associate foreign actions with their domestic situation. Simultaneously, they often 
underappreciate how foreign governments need to consider other factors, including domestic 
factors of the foreign government and the influence of third parties. Consistent with this self-
centered bias, countries tend to overestimate their importance as influences or targets in the 
decision of others.37 Perceivers tend to believe that other countries inflict harm on them because 
of these countries’ aggression and hostility. In reality, however, they often fail to understand that 
the actions of foreign countries are responses to perceivers. Both centralization and 
overestimation of one’s importance highlight the self-bias of innocence.  
To a certain degree, Jervis argues that the self-bias of innocence reflects the desires and 
fears of the perceiver because of human’s nature of cognitive consistency and the centrality 
nature of perception. Cognitive consistency and centrality translate to the fact that perception is 
hard to change; once the threat is perceived, the perceiver may take a long time and a great 
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amount of efforts to reduce the perception of threat. Jervis summarized eight reasons or excuses 
why leaders often find it difficult to change perceptions.38 People tend to overlook new 
information when it contradicts to their original perception.39 It could take the form of a failure 
to notice the information or a purposeful misunderstanding of its original intent. If they do 
recognize the contradiction, people tend to question the validity of the information before 
accepting it, or question the source of the information.40 When validity is no longer a problem, 
people prefer to describe the new information as unexplainable, or find competing evidence to 
support their old perceptions or undermine the new information.41 If the new information survive 
the examination of all previous excuses, then people will either split up the new information and 
discredit the false part, or build the new information into a larger picture that is disturbing.42 
Either way, to discredit the new information that could potentially alter the old perception, 
people try to connect it with problematic arguments or perceptions. Cognitive consistency 
becomes a problem when the confirmation bias of perceivers becomes too strong. In such a case, 
when they face cognitive dissonance where perceivers fail to rationalize others’ actions with 
their previous belief, they tend to reduce dissonance and achieve consistency by distorting or 
avoiding some information.43 In addition, “desires and fears have the most impact when the 
perception matters least—the actor has no incentives to perceive accurately because the actor 
cannot act on what  he believes will happen.”44 All four misperceptions Jervis raises, under this 
circumstance, are likely to persist altogether. 
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With the five variables and six heuristic filters of misperception in mind, we are ready to 
look into empirical evidence of American and Chinese perceptions in the next Chapter, after 
which the theoretical framework will be applied to two case studies and the overall Chinese 
foreign policy. 
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Chapter 3 – The Model Chapter 
The goal of this chapter is to compare and contrast the difference between three 
perspectives: the objective narration, the Chinese perception, and the American perception. The 
objective narration will outline major achievements in Chinese foreign policy. I will only discuss 
the concrete significance of these developments that can be verified. The Chinese perception will 
mostly cover how the Chinese government sees the development of Chinese foreign policy. 
Similarly, the sections on the American perception will give a nuanced illustration of how the 
United States views Chinese foreign policy. Because of the “revolving door” system of 
American politics, major U.S. scholars influence the U.S. perspective in ways that their Chinese 
counterparts do not. Therefore, the American sources analyzed here include not only government 
reports and presidential speeches, but also the opinions of major China experts in the United 
States. Some experts may have served in the government, or have had interactions with 
Washington for a significant amount of time; others simply are influential enough to swing how 
the field views U.S.-China relations. 
This comparison will be carried out first holistically, and then in four dimensions. I will 
first give the background for each perspective and summarize major historical events that have 
led to the current perspective. Then the first dimension will cover the development of China’s 
bilateral relations with major countries and regions in the world, including its relations with the 
U.S., Russia, its neighbors, and major blocs of the world. The second dimension will be China’s 
multilateral relations and its role in regional and global institutions. The third dimension will 
focus on China’s development in the security arena, as well as its stances on major security 
issues in the region. The development of the People’s Liberation Army will also be discussed. 
The last dimension will focus on China’s economic engagement with the rest of the world, as 
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well as its flagship policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). BRI, as well as with its 
financing sources, attracts the world’s attention and receives different perceptions in the U.S. 
than it does in China. By comparing and contrasting the Chinese and American perceptions on 
Chinese foreign policy, as well as how each differs from a more objective description, this 
chapter will contribute to understanding where major disagreements are grounded and where 
policy recommendations are needed. 
 
I. The Background 
1. The Objective Narration 
The foreign relations of the People’s Republic of China had a rough start. The Cold War 
started as the young republic was founded. Due to the split in political ideology, China fell into 
the Soviet Union-led communist regime. It was thus disconnected from the first world. During 
the first thirty years of its development, China was mostly inward-looking and carried out several 
falsely directed campaigns. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution attracted very 
few countries to befriend China. It was not until the end of the Cultural Revolution, the opening 
up and reform, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and a series of domestic and international events 
that China started to emerge at the international stage. There are two major turning points for 
China’s diplomacy: first, at the 1976th plenary meeting of the United Nations General Assembly 
on October 25, 1971, Resolution 2758 was passed to recognize the People’s Republic as the only 
legitimate representatives of China. Second, the United States transferred its diplomatic 
recognition from the Republic of China government in Taipei to the People’s Republic in 
Beijing. With both domestic reforms and diplomatic victories, China’s foreign relations went 
into a stage of rapid development. 
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 Despite the 1989 crackdown at the Tiananmen Square that endangered China’s foreign 
relations briefly, its overall development has been vigorous. Today, more than 175 countries 
have diplomatic relations with China.45 Furthermore, it has become highly active in regional and 
global institutions. After joining the World Trade Organization, China has become the largest 
exporter and the second largest importer in world trade (merchandise) by 2016.46 As one of five 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, China has also participated in many 
peacekeeping missions abroad and led the Six-Party Talks to resolve the Korean nuclear crisis. 
In addition to its involvement in existing institutions, China has also led the creation of BRICS, 
the informal institution of emerging markets, and launched the Belt and Road Initiative, and its 
financing bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.  
 Besides opportunities, China also faces regional and global economic and security 
challenges. Domestic economic pressure has heightened. After initial demographic dividends 
have almost been depleted, China needs to deepen its economic reform to search for new drivers. 
Internationally, the United States has backtracked on its leadership in global economic 
integration, as isolationism and protectionism have grown in other countries as well. In January 
2017, U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out from the Trans-Pacific Partnership right after his 
inauguration.47 Seven months later, he withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement.48 At the 
same time, China faced serious security challenges near its border. The nationalization of 
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Diaoyu/Senkaku islands by the Japanese government in 2014, Tsai Ing-wen’s election in Taiwan 
in 2016, the international tribunal ruling over the South China Sea dispute in 2016, and the 
Donglang/Doklam standoff near the China-India border in 2017 each touched a sensitive nerve. 
With rising tensions and committed security cooperation among the U.S., Japan, Australia, and 
India, Beijing could find itself entangled easily in conflicts with others. In sum, the historical 
events and the current international political environment provides China both challenges and 
opportunities.  
 
2. The Chinese Perspective 
To study the Chinese perspective of the Chinese foreign policy, it is important to look 
back far enough to include China’s early contact with the West during the Qing dynasty. After 
the industrial revolution, the productivity of the western countries improved significantly; in 
comparison, the Qing dynasty dwarfed by more than half a century. Nonetheless, due to the 
isolationist policies Qing emperors conducted, Qing officials and elites were not aware of 
China’s relative weak position to the West. It was not until the first Opium War when Qing 
China was defeated by Britain swiftly did the Qing court realize how far it was lagged behind. 
From 1839 to 1945, China experienced the darkest century according to the Chinese history 
textbook. Several wars broke out and China lost all except for the World War II; many unequal 
treaties were signed; war compensation was paid in silver and gold with a huge amount; several 
pieces of land were ceded to western imperialists. It was not until the victory of the World War II 
did China finally expel all foreign powers from its territory (except for Hong Kong and Macau).  
The idea of “century of humiliation,” despite its end in 1945, has been ingrained in 
Chinese elites and the public since then. The Communist government mobilized the victimhood 
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narrative and adopted a strategy of “active defense” to defend its sovereignty. In 1950, just a year 
after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong championed the “active 
defense” strategy and crossed the Yalu River when he believed that the U.S.-led UN force 
threatened the survival of the young republic. Again, in 1969, he carried out a preemptive strike 
over the disputed Zhenbao island near the Sino-Russian border. After the opening up and reform, 
the “active strategy,” though mentioned even less frequently, has persisted. With regard to the 
provocative behavior of Vietnam, the independence movement in Taiwan, and the islands 
dispute in East and South China Seas, the Chinese government continued taking actions to 
ensure that its positions in different issues were well-taken by its opponents. 
After Deng Xiaoping’s opening up and reform in the late 1970s, China needed a more 
peaceful environment to catch up its economy. China has taken a more peaceful rhetoric that 
highlights how economic engagement can create mutually beneficial relations with the rest of the 
world. Deng Xiaoping, the chief designer of China’s economic revival, proposed a 24-character 
guiding principle for China’s foreign policy: “observe calmly, secure our position, cope with 
affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and 
never claim leadership.”49 Such a guiding principle carried on the low-key tradition of the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence proposed by China’s first Premier, Zhou Enlai. Although 
China’s economy has blossomed since then, senior Chinese officials periodically reaffirmed 
Beijing’s intention to stick to a peaceful rise. In 2005, Zheng Bijian, a senior Communist Party 
official, wrote in Foreign Affairs that “China does not seek hegemony or predominance in world 
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affairs.”50 In 2011, Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo confirmed that “peaceful development 
is a strategic choice China has made.”51 
Since Xi Jinping became the Secretary General of the Communist Party of China (CCP) 
after the 18th Party Congress in November 2012 and the President of People’s Republic of China 
in March 2013, he has been at the center of Chinese politics. Having “two centenary goals” and 
the mission of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese dream in mind, the Party leadership aims to 
“[take] into account both China’s domestic and international interests, [attach] importance to 
both development and security,” and “[pursue] major-country diplomacy with distinctive 
Chinese features.”52 Nowadays, Beijing emphasized the backwardness of the international 
system, arguing that the global order should be updated to ensure that it reflects the increasing 
weight of emerging market.53 The current Chinese government, which seldom mentions Deng’s 
guiding principles, believes that “hide and bide” should not apply in the same way as before.54 
Beijing needs to take a larger responsibility in ensuring a peaceful global order that is up-to-date 
and reflects Beijing’s interests. 
 
3. The American Perspective 
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 To start off the American perspective of the Chinese foreign policy, one should always 
remind oneself the assumptions that has made in the early stage of U.S-China engagement. After 
the normalization of U.S.-China relations, China has adopted a set of economic reforms, which 
liberated its economy in unprecedented ways. China pundits in America believed that, to make 
China a more advanced economy, the Chinese government would carry out more economic 
reforms, and further liberated both political and economic institutions.55 Thus, Washington 
pursues a strategy of engagement in the hope that, by inviting China to the international 
community, the U.S. and the international community will be able to make China more liberal; 
China would be so interconnected with the West that backtracking would be not only unwelcome 
but also impossible. And such a result would strengthen the global order that was built by 
America.  
 The 1990 National Security Strategy (NSS), signed by U.S. President George H. W. 
Bush, openly showed Washington’s willingness to adopt such an engagement policy. The 1990 
NSS “described [China’s] enhanced ties with the world as ‘crucial to China’s prospects for 
regaining the path of economic reform.’”56 The Clinton Administration continued Bush’s 
strategy to China and expanded it to the security dimension. The 1995 NSS said that the United 
States would “strongly promote China’s participation in regional security mechanism to reassure 
its neighbors and assuage its own security concerns.”57 Increasing bilateral connections in all 
dimensions followed these statements, though economic and civil connections outpaced security 
engagement.  
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 After two decades of engagement, however, the United States does not see a politically, 
economically, and socially liberal China that is closer to what it expected. The current Chinese 
system, which disappoints the White House and the Capitol, is doing just fine in terms of 
economic growth. More than that, because China has become economically stronger, its political 
and military power also expands rapidly. Now China has the capacity to potentially challenge the 
international system established since the end of World War II. The pressure on Washington has 
grown significantly. In the most recent 2017 National Security Strategy, the U.S. admits that its 
China policy was not successful.  
 
“For decades, U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise 
and for its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China. 
Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of 
others. China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and spreads features of its 
authoritarian system, including corruption and the use of surveillance. It is building the 
most capable and well-funded military in the world, after our own. Its nuclear arsenal is 
growing and diversifying. Part of China’s military modernization and economic 
expansion is due to its access to the U.S. innovation economy, including America’s 
world-class universities.”58 
 
The U.S. perceives Chinese foreign policy in all dimensions as a challenge to the U.S. interests, 
and considers many of China’s actions provocative. The report views China, along with Russia, a 
“strategic competitor” to the U.S., returning to a phrase that was only used during the early 
George W. Bush administration last time.  
 At the strategy level, the U.S. increasingly sees China as a challenger and threat. At the 
tactics level, the current U.S. government summarizes the actions of Chinese foreign policy into 
two categories: charm offensive, a term created by Council on Foreign Relations scholar Joshua 
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Kurlantzick, and coercion.59 According to the 2017 Annual Report to Congress of the U.S-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, charm offensive is embodied by the Belt and Road 
Initiative through which China grows its influence overseas. Coercion is a more self-explanatory 
means that China used near its territory, such as using its coast guards to expel fishermen from 
its neighbor countries. Most recently, two scholars from the National Endowment for 
Democracy, Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, coined the term sharp power to describe 
Chinese behaviors.60 Inspired by the idea of soft power, sharp power referred to the reliance on 
“subversion, bullying and pressure, which combine to promote self-censorship.”61 They believed 
that China, with the help of sharp power, will compel behavior at home and manipulate opinion 
abroad. Harvard Professor Joseph Nye illustrated China’s employment of sharp power through 
China Radio International’s support of foreign radios to promote Chinese interests abroad.62  
Including key officials in the Trump administration, most scholars on China in the U.S. 
now possess a zero-sum assumption and call for a tougher U.S. stance on China. After two 
decades of waiting, they did not see the change from China that will make two countries’ 
interests align. Nonetheless, some scholars still believe that positive sum is likely to occur and is 
conducive to future U.S.-China relations. Although they believe that China does promote its 
influence abroad with unacceptable means, they are also worried about the backlash of shutting 
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down all Chinese soft power tools.63 Michael Swaine, the China expert at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, also criticized an oversimplified argument that called China 
a threat.64 To solve many critical issues such as climate change or North Korean nuclear crisis, 
they believe China and the U.S. have shared interests with fundamental significance. In the 
current administration, the chance is near zero that such a position will prevail in the American 
perspective. 
 
II. Bilateral Relations 
1. The Objective Narration 
 China’s rise in all dimensions has received the world’s attention. In many figures, China 
has quickly surpassed Japan and many traditional European countries and approached closely to 
the United States. The United States, as the single global power, bears the brunt of such a 
phenomenon. The Obama administration was fully aware of the importance of China’s 
ascension. To many’s surprise, President Hu Jintao and President Obama had their first meeting 
in China during Obama’s first year in office in November 2009.65 After President Xi of China 
took office, in June 2013, the American and Chinese presidents met at the Sunnylands estate in 
Southern California where China’s proposal of building a “new model of major power relations” 
received some consensus from both sides.66 The proposal contains three major parts: no conflict 
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or confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation. The communication between the U.S. 
and China increased significantly during the Obama-Xi period. Areas of collaboration expanded 
as well: trade, regional security, climate change, cybersecurity and so on. 
 During the Xi-Trump era, China’s relations with the U.S. marked a diplomatically 
friendly yet practically unfriendly turn. In April 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump hosted his 
first meeting with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. At the end of the meeting, they jointly 
declared to upgrade the strategic and economic dialogue during Obama’s administration to a 
comprehensive dialogue that includes four pillars, including the diplomatic and security 
dialogue, the comprehensive economic dialogue, the law enforcement and cybersecurity 
dialogue, and social and cultural issues dialogue.67 Despite initially cordial contacts between the 
two presidents, tensions have been on the rise, especially in trade. In the first two months of 
2018, there have been several commercial acquisitions that were blocked by the U.S. 
governments. On January 2, 2018, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
blocked Ant Financial’s acquisition of MoneyGram on national security grounds, giving a major 
blow to the internet giant Alibaba who owns Ant Financial. A month later on February 15, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of the U.S. federal government halted the sale of the 
Chicago Stock Exchange to Chinese investors.68 A week later, another Chinese acquisition of a 
U.S. semiconductor testing company was blocked.69  
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 Sino-Russian relations, another major bilateral relationship that Beijing has devoted 
much energy to cultivate, have advanced significantly over the past two decades. There has been 
an increase in collaboration in many fields between the two countries. After the West sanctioned 
Russia for its annexation of Crimea and its involvement in the Ukraine crisis, China has been the 
major export destination for Russia’s natural resources and an expanding source for capital 
inflow.70 In reciprocity, China has been increasing its energy reliance on Russia. From 2013 to 
2016, the share of Russian oil supply in the total Chinese oil import approximately doubled. 
Russia jumped from the fourth largest oil supplier to the largest one that tied with Saudi 
Arabia.71 The oil industry is just one industry among many that reflects the growing 
collaboration between Russia and China. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to Russia in 
2015, 32 cooperative documents were signed.72 Among them, there is a joint statement on 
coordination between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic 
Union. Such a cooperation reflects a deep willingness between Moscow and Beijing to further 
their shared interests. Besides economic cooperation, diplomatic exchanges and military 
cooperation follow the tide as well. Diplomatically, Russian President Vladimir Putin met Xi at 
least five times in 2017.73 Militarily, Russia resumed its sale of advanced weaponry to China 
after a decade of implicit arms embargo due to China’s unlicensed copying. After Xi’s 
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inaugration, Russia has sold China S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile system and 24 Sukoi Su-
35 fighter jets. Both deals reached $8 billion USD in total.74 Such a close relationship 
corresponds with the elevation of Sino-Russia relations. In 2014, both governments decided to 
elevate their relations to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination, which is a 
rarely used term that describes the unprecedented level of cooperation between China and Russia 
so far.  
 In addition to the Sino-U.S. and Sino-Russia relations, China also focused heavily on 
developing its relations with neighboring countries. In Northeast Asia, China, South Korea and 
Japan held trilateral summits perennially. However, the summit was often interrupted and 
delayed by disagreements or tensions between two parties of the three. Territorial dispute 
between China and Japan on Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and that between South Korea and Japan 
on the Liancourt Rocks, comfort women issues between South Korea and Japan, and the 
deployment of THAAD all prohibit regional cooperation and coordination.  
In Southeast Asia, China had closer relations with both ASEAN and its member 
countries. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road was proposed by President Xi Jinping in 
Indonesia. China maintained an especially congenial relations with Cambodia, helping Cambodia 
build one of the largest hydroelectric power stations.75 In exchange, Cambodia blocked an 
ASEAN statement that addressed ASEAN countries’ concern over the South China Sea disputes. 
China offered similar assistance or economic cooperation package to other ASEAN countries. A 
prominent case is one in which, after Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte reversed his 
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predecessor’s position on South China Sea dispute, China gave lavish assistance to Duterte for 
combating poverty and counterterrorism.  
In South Asia, India and Pakistan are two important neighbors of China. China-Pakistan 
relations have been elevated to all-weather strategic partnership in 2005, a unique category in the 
Chinese foreign policy lexicon. The close relations between the two worries India significantly. 
As China started to develop its southwest border, India’s worry continuously grew. On behalf of 
Bhutan, India finally initiated a military standoff between China and India in Donglang/Doklam 
region since June 2017. Although the standoff ended in August without turning into a hot 
conflict, tensions between the two countries have not subsided by much. 
Last but not least, China developed different levels of strategic partnerships with major 
blocs or the world, including Europe, Africa, and Latin America. With notable progress, China 
has expanded its bilateral partnerships to 97 different countries and regions by August 2017.76 
 
2. The Chinese Perspective 
Among all its bilateral relations, China deems its relations with great powers the most 
important ones. In the past half a decade, China has consolidated its guiding principle of foreign 
policy, which is the major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. From this guiding 
principle, it has derived the new model (form) of major country relations between China and the 
United States. First raised in 2010, it was put forward by the State Conciliator of China, Dai 
Bingguo, during the second round of the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue.77 In 2013, 
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President Obama and President Xi agreed on collaboratively building this new model.78 
Gradually, China has expanded on this idea and consolidated it into the major-country diplomacy 
with Chinese characteristics. As of 2017, this term has fueled the narrative of each and every 
major document and speech conducted by the CCP leadership.  
 The proposal of the new model of major country relations between China and the U.S. 
renders Sino-U.S. relations as one of the most important bilateral relations in the world. The new 
model is alleged to abandon the traditional realist assumption of the balance of power between 
states. In his speech in Seattle in 2015, President Xi Jinping outlined four points that he deemed 
important for healthy Sino-U.S. relations. 
 
First, we must read each other's strategy correctly. Building a new model of major 
country relationship with the United States that features non-conflict, non-
confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation79 is the priority of China's 
foreign policy…Second, we must firmly advance win-win cooperation…  Third, we must 
manage our differences properly and effectively… Fourth, we must foster friendly 
sentiments among our peoples...80 
 
For President Xi and the Chinese government, the top priority in advancing Sino-U.S. relations is 
risk control. The first and the third points call for effective communication; the second and the 
fourth points emphasize strengthening economic and cultural interdependence. Through forging 
effective communication and deep interdependence, the Chinese government aims to avoid 
escalating tensions. As President Xi said, “there is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides trap 
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in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic 
miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.”81 
Beijing’s attitude towards Sino-U.S. relations is not consistent at the international and 
domestic levels. While Beijing tries to push the idea of building a new type of Sino-U.S. 
relations that benefit both globally, it constantly heeds the encroachment of democracy and 
liberal ideas from America domestically. Chinese domestic publications often warn its citizens 
that the U.S. constantly tries to westernize and fragmentize China.82 The Chinese government is 
fully aware of its ambivalence towards the U.S. Yet, it has not been able to avoid it due to the 
fact that both economic performance and ideological loyalty are important for the regime 
survival of the Communist Party. 
 Russia is another great power accepted by China. Unlike its relations with the U.S., 
China-Russia relations is the exemplar of the major-country diplomacy with Chinese 
characteristics. Both countries have seen each other as the priorities of foreign relations. That’s 
what both said; that’s also what both did. Russia is the first foreign country Xi visited after his 
inauguration in 2013; in the written statement prior to the trip, Xi said: “China will make 
developing relations with Russia a priority in its foreign policy orientation.”83 In reciprocity, 
Russia invited Xi to visit Russian Defense Ministry, and Putin commented that the Russian-
China relations is at “the best in their centuries-long history.”84 The Chinese government 
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believes that Sino-Russian relations create a win-win situation that supersedes traditional western 
zero-sum theory of the balance of power. China’s collaboration with Russia is “a ballast stone for 
world peace and stability.”85 Despite the close relationship, Fu Ying, the chair of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress of People’s Republic of China, 
representing the Chinese government, openly stated in a Foreign Affairs article that it does not 
seek an alliance with the Kremlin, as the only objective for Sino-Russian relations for the 
Chinese government is to work on mutually beneficial fields.86 
Regarding China’s relations with its neighboring countries, Xi Jinping, in his book The 
Governance of China, raised the concept of “friendship, equality, sincerity, reciprocity, and 
inclusiveness” to achieve win-win outcomes.87 Despite the power asymmetry between China and 
its neighbors in favor of China, Xi rejects the notion that China should be the model for other 
states necessarily, and moreover, highlights China’s non-interference in other countries’ 
domestic affairs.88 In a similar vein, China believes that, while promoting economically 
favorable conditions between China and other regions in the world, it should not sell its model 
abroad and involve itself with another hegemonic power.89 With such a mindset, China has co-
established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China-ASEAN cooperation mechanism, 
China-Arab Cooperation Forum, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China and Central and 
Eastern European Countries’ Leaders Conference, China-Pacific Islands Forum, and China-
CELAC Forum, covering all parts of the developing world. 
																																																						
85 "China, Russia Pledge to Play Role of Ballast Stone for World Peace." China Daily. July 5, 2017. Accessed 
February 23, 2018. http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2017-07/05/content_30001645.htm  
86 Ying Fu, "How China Sees Russia", Foreign Affairs, January 2016, accessed December 8, 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-12-14/how-china-sees-russia. 
87 Michael D. Swaine, "Xi Jinping on Chinese Foreign Relations: The Governance of China and Chinese 
Commentary," China Leadership Monitor, no. 48 (September 9, 2015): 2, 
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm48ms.pdf.  
88 Ibid, 6. 
89 Ibid, 7. 
  44 
 
3. The American Perspective 
 American politicians and scholars have all recognized the rise of China. As the global 
center of power moved to Asia, China’s rise attracted America’s attention and touched 
Washington’s nerve at the same time. The Obama administration started with a limited 
experience with China. Obama’s first presidential trip to China is his first trip there ever. Despite 
having little knowledge about China, President Obama had a vision that “America should evolve 
from a leader into a partner globally.”90 Obama embodied the belief that the U.S. should give 
more attention to the rise of the emerging markets who could potentially change the global order. 
Thus, he often stated at the beginning of his two-term presidency that America welcomes the rise 
of China. His initial amiable posture gave the media a false impression that America was 
forming a G-2 with China, which upset both domestic political powers and American allies and 
partners in Asia-Pacific. The Trump administration has an “America First” policy that directly 
formulated a negative rhetoric for U.S.-China relations. However, the Trump administration does 
not have a coherent China attitude or China policy. In the economic dimension, President Trump 
accused that China has stolen millions of jobs from America in multiple occasions, yet he did not 
“blame” China for doing so.91 In the security dimension, President Trump swayed back and 
forth, sometimes appreciating China’s help to solve the threat of North Korea, while other times 
criticizing China for not pressuring Pyongyang hard enough. Overall, the Trump administration 
has taken a tougher but inconsistent stance on China’s foreign policy. 
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 The increasingly close relations between China and Russia worry many people in 
Washington and in the West in general. Studies from Washington and its related institutions 
highlight two features of Sino-Russian relations that the U.S. finds particularly threatening. For 
one, the U.S. believes that Sino-Russian relations have become asymmetrical, in favor of China. 
Alexander Gabuev, a scholar at Carnegie Moscow Center, the Russian branch of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, represents a group of scholars who views China as the only 
accessible and substantially large market for Russia after Moscow was sanctioned by the West. 
The lack of alternatives gives China a leg up in Sino-Russian relations that China could compel 
Russia in defending Beijing’s interests.92 This is closely linked to the second concern of 
Washington: China and Russia are building a de facto anti-West alliance. In a Russia-China 
relations report compiled by the National Bureau of Asian Research, former Senior Director for 
Asia on the National Security Council Evan S. Medeiros and senior scholar at RAND 
Corporation Michael S. Chase identify China’s motivations as “spanning Chinese perceptions, 
interests, and preferences about global security, economic, and diplomatic affairs.”93 Whether 
Russia is on board because of China or because of other reasons does not make a huge 
difference; the most recent 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy 
name China and Russia as the largest threats to the United States, pointing out that the U.S. 
should be prepared to preserve its values and the international system from being subverted by 
Russia and China. There will be more discussion in the security section on how the U.S. 
specifically view China, in collaboration with Russia, threatening America’s global security 
paradigm. 
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In terms of China’s relations with its neighbors as well as major blocs of the world, the 
U.S. worries that China is shaping other countries’ behavior through its different types of power, 
especially its economic power. Two examples will illustrate Washington’s concern. The first 
case is the Philippines. Soon after assuming office, Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte made a 
diplomatic turn, pivoting away from America and getting closer to China. To solidify Duterte’s 
rebalance to China, Beijing rewarded Manila extensively. During Duterte’s state visit to China in 
October 2016, China granted the Philippines $9 billion USD in credit, including $6 billion USD 
in soft loans.94 In addition, Xi and Duterte signed 13 bilateral cooperation documents, one of 
which promised to build a $700 million USD steel plant in the Philippines.95 China’s economic 
partnership with Duterte reassured him that his rebalance will not have negative economic 
repercussion. A sustained China-Philippines friendship undermines America’s strategic interests 
near a major point of contention, the South China Sea. The 2017 National Security Strategy 
warns that China is trying to “pull the region into its orbit through state-led investments and 
loans.”96 Another case is in a developed country, Greece. In June 2017, Greece blocked an EU 
criticism on China’s human rights after a Chinese made a huge investment in Greece’s port of 
Piraeus.97 Such a series of incidents corroborates the fear of western governments, especially that 
of the American government, that China might be able to use its economic superiority to 
penetrate western democracies and force them to give in to China’s influence. As written in the 
2017 National Security Strategy, one of the priority action for America is to “help maintain the 
sovereignty [of different countries] as China increases its influence in the region.”98 
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III. Multilateral Diplomacy 
1. The Objective Narration 
China has been long interested in pursuing multilateral diplomacy. In the first ten years of 
the 21st century, China mostly joined international institutions and participated in newly founded 
regional institutions. China became an official World Trade Organization (WTO) member in 
2001, and jointly started AESAN+3 and ASEAN+6. In the same year, China led the creation of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with Russia, connecting countries in Central Asia. In 
2006, the BRICs, an organization for emerging markets, was founded. Security-wise, China took 
the initiative in holding and maintaining the Six-Party Talks.  
Starting in the second ten years, China’s multilateral diplomacy began to enlarge its circle 
of influence. In October and November 2013, the Chinese government raised the idea of building 
“the Silk Road Economic Belt” (SREB) and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (MSR), 
aspiring to connect East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Eurasia, and Europe. 
Together known as the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) strategy or the “Belt and Road Initiative” 
(BRI), the initiative shifted China’s focus westward. Although the U.S. tried to dissuade its 
European and Asian partners and allies from joining the initiative, BRI was welcomed by 
European powers such as Britain, France, and Germany as they see the prosperity of Eurasia as 
the key to further their economic growth.99 
 Beijing’s initiative is well-equipped with funding sources. The creation of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) aimed at matching the function of the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the Japanese-led Asian Development Bank as a multilateral 
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financing source.100 Despite U.S. opposition, many U.S. allies like Australia, South Korea, 
Britain, and France joined the AIIB as founding members. China intends to perform massive 
infrastructure building, including 80,000 kilometers of high-speed rail links, “major expansion of 
road, oil and gas pipelines and digital cables, along with power production and energy grids.”101 
The initial funding of the AIIB is supposed to surpass at least $100 billion. Further, the Chinese 
government devoted enough money into other funds, with $40 billion for Silk Road Fund, $46 
billion for the China-Pakistan economic corridor, and $10 billion for the BRICS-led New 
Development Bank. The China Development Bank believes that the total spending for BRI 
should reach $1 trillion.102 
 In addition to founding new institutions, Chinese leaders hosted and appeared in the most 
important meetings and conferences around the world. In 2014, China hosted the 22nd APEC 
Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Beijing. In 2016, China hosted the G20 summit in Hangzhou. In 
2017, President Xi Jinping gave a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Later in the 
same year, China hosted the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, discussing the 
possibility of pushing forward ideas that could propel global development. All of this progress 
has suggested that China has assumed an increasingly larger role in global governance. 
Compared to the first ten years of 21st century, the second ten years have become more 
economically focused. 
 
2. The Chinese Perspective 
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After more than four decades in the United Nations, two decades in the World Trade 
Organization, and a decade participating in the leaders’ summits of G20, China believed that the 
American-built global governance system are “the world’s only set of fairly mature multilateral 
governance regimes that covers all sovereign states.”103 However, China has several concerns 
over the system in which emerging markets are not proportionally represented, including the 
U.S. commitment in maintaining and continuously investing in such a regime to reflect the new 
interests. Simultaneously, China sees the concern from Washington where local politicians are 
worried that China will give up Deng Xiaoping’s “hide and bide” and become assertive 
globally.104 
In light of the concerns of both Chinese and Americans, China champions 
“democratization in international relations based on national sovereignty.”105 Specifically, China 
adopts a three-step approach to global governance reform.106 First, China believes that the 
existing system is beneficial to most of the countries in the world. Thus, China only reforms 
necessary parts that can make it fairer and more efficient. It does not aim for a revisionist 
outcome. Second, the reform will be based on the common standing of all entities involved. And 
thirdly, China will try to work closely with the United States to reform global institutions. As 
Chinese President Xi Jinping said at UN Office in Geneva in January 2017, the world has been 
deeply connected, and it should aim at building a community of common destiny.107  
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3. The American Perspective 
 Washington fully understands Beijing’s desire to reform the structure of global 
institutions. It poses a welcoming posture to this inclination because it understands that when the 
U.S. and China work together, it is often much easier to reach an efficient outcome. However, 
Washington is very careful about how China promotes its interests. It is afraid that China would 
undermine U.S. interests in the process of reform. This worry has increased especially in the past 
few years because China took a stronger stance in its participation in multilateral institutions and 
global governance. Washington’s concern is exacerbated by two factors of this participation. On 
the one hand, American experts on China believe that regional institutions such as the Asian 
Development Bank cannot match the rising capability of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank.108 On the other hand, they believe that the picture that President Xi tries to show the global 
community does not match the reality.109 On the economic front, China has become domestically 
protectionist and continues to put restrictions on global movements of capital and ideas. On the 
political front, China rejects the Hague ruling of the South China Sea dispute, discrediting the 
Hague court as a credible rule-based multilateral institutions. In addition, China disappointed 
Washington because China, as a permanent UN Security Council member, has vetoed and 
threatened to veto resolutions that it deemed harmful to its interests.110 Growing pessimism in the 
U.S. does not mean that American experts on China are discrediting China’s global governance 
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efforts. After the U.S. pulled out from the Paris Climate Agreement, China’s leadership in global 
climate and environment governance received a welcome from the United States. In this field, 
Beijing earned Washington’s trust because Washington believes that Beijing’s global and 
domestic environmental interests align almost perfectly.111 Thus, Beijing’s benign intention is 
taken well by Washington. 
 
IV. Security and Military 
1. The Objective Narration 
The security environment around China has been complicated. There are several major 
issues at stake, including THAAD missile defense system in South Korea, the East and South 
China Seas dispute and defense, Taiwan, and Doklam/Donglang standoff with regard to India. 
Facing these security concerns, China has taken multiple steps in response. In November 2013, 
China unexpectedly declared an air defense identification zone (ADIZ), which overlaps with 
South Korea’s and Japan’s ADIZ. In late March 2014, the Chinese Coast Guard provoked 
negative reactions in the Philippines by harassing and attempting to block a Filipino ship 
bringing supplies and fresh troops to a Filipino Navy ship that had been grounded on the 
disputed Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 and had been occupied by Filipino Marines ever since. 
Islands reclamation and construction in the South China Sea have been continuing. Most 
constructions could serve both civil and military uses, including airports and warehouses. Most 
recently, however, China has set up jammers on some islands in the South China Sea for 
exclusive military use.112 Similar construction has also happened near Sino-Indian border where 
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recently built roads enable China to projectile its power more rapidly and closer to its border. For 
THAAD and Taiwan issues, China has mixed security and economic responses. China has cut 
trade in both goods and services with South Korea and Taiwan after each became provocative to 
Beijing.113 Most recently, the Chinese battleships and airplanes conducted drills that encircled 
the Taiwan islands.114 
The complex geopolitical situations around China means that China needs to put a lot of 
resources into building up its military and security paradigm. China’s military spending has 
continued to grow over the past decades. In the last five years, average defense budget increase 
has been around 10 percent. In recent years, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has launched 
massive modernization programs. China’s military upgrade has been across different arms of 
services. In the PLA Navy, the first aircraft carrier “Liaoning” was commissioned in 2012 and 
was combat-ready in 2016. In addition, new supply ships, naval training ships, and a new-
generation destroyer were introduced in the past few years. In the PLA Air Force, J-20 stealth 
fighter jets have started to build up operational capability. J-15 carrier-based fighter jets are also 
in the process of training with “Liaoning.” J-31 stealth fighter jets are also being built. H-6K 
bombers also conducted several long-range trips into the Pacific. In the PLA Rocket Force, the 
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile posed a serious danger to the navy of foreign forces. Nuclear 
modernization of China poses a greater deterrence to other nuclear powers. 
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2. The Chinese Perspective 
 China’s national strategy is “to secure a peaceful environment for China’s development 
and to maintain and promote world peace through its development.”115 To achieve its stated goal, 
Beijing believes that military modernization and capacity building are necessary to protect its 
national interests, including “[maintaining] national sovereignty, security, unification, and 
territorial integrity; [addressing] military threats and emergencies; [safeguarding] the political 
system and the leadership of the Communist Party of China stipulated in the Constitution; 
[promoting] social stability and sustained economic development; and [contributing] to world 
peace.”116 
 To serve China’s national strategy and core interests, China’s overall military and 
security strategy includes “guideline of active defense, and the principles of defense, self-
defense, and retaliation as opposed to pre-emptive strikes,” which dictate its policies and actions 
in the region.117 Facing the pressure of U.S. rebalance to Asia strategy, China tries to ensure its 
sphere of influence and protect its core interests. On the issue of Taiwan, Donglang, and the 
South China Sea, China is determined to protect its sovereignty. On the issue of the danger of 
THAAD and nuclear threat of North Korea, the Chinese government has opted for a more vocal 
than practical response.118 Both of them show that, despite its capacity building and 
determination, China understands that any form of military competition with the U.S. is not in 
the interest of China and prefers a stable Asia without military confrontation. China would prefer 
not to put itself in an arms race.119 Overall, the Chinese government has demonstrated a 
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generally tough attitude regarding its security interests though there are many practical 
reservations. 
 
3. The American Perspective 
In the past half a decade, the American perception on Chinese security and military 
policy has worsened significantly. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledged that 
powerful military forces are emerging, highlighting China’s continuing military modernization. 
The concern was “lack of transparency and openness from China’s leaders regarding both 
military capabilities and intentions.”120 Since 2015, the “China threat” argument has become 
much stronger. The 2015 National Security Strategy has identified China’s involvement in the 
East and South China Seas as a threat to American security interests. The “China threat” 
argument has also been revealed in the 2015 National Military Strategy and the 2016 Defense 
Posture Statement.121 Under the Trump Administration, the “China threat” argument looms even 
larger. In the 2017 National Security Strategy, China is said to be the most significant security 
challenge to the United States.122 In the 2018 National Defense Strategy, China is first mentioned 
as a “strategic competitor” to the United States and a “revisionist power.”123 In addition, the U.S. 
has viewed Chinese military and security buildups as coercive in nature by gaining “veto power 
of other nations’ decision,” “displacing the U.S. in the [Asia-Pacific] region, “[replacing] U.S. 
military hegemony” with its own.124  
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Regarding specific Chinese military and security actions in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. 
deems them as signs of a fundamental disregard of U.S. interests in the region and a challenge to 
U.S. global military hegemony. These actions take a variety of forms. 125 The creation of the East 
China Sea ADIZ took the political form. Putting trade barriers against South Korea took the 
economic form. Building roads in China-India-Bhutan border and seizing the Scarborough Shoal 
took the physical form. Nonetheless, all these actions demonstrate an increasing amount of 
assertiveness of the Chinese government and the PLA.126  
A special report written by three U.S. military experts, namely David M. Finkelstein, 
Phillip C. Saunders, and Randall G. Schriver, reveals some common perceptions in the U.S. 
defense circles regarding China and its defense policy.127 These typical perceptions include 1) 
that CCP believes that the U.S. is generally politically hostile towards the regime and hopes to 
adopt a containment strategy, 2) that the PLA assessment has indirectly pointed out that the U.S. 
has “dark motives” against the PLA, 3) that “China’s desire to counter U.S. capabilities… in the 
vicinity of the PRC” drives the PLA modernization and military policy, 4) that, fortunately, both 
the PLA and the U.S. military would love to reduce unnecessary confrontations when possible, 
and 5) that both believe direct military conflicts are more likely to happen in the sea. 
 
IV. Economic Engagement 
1. The Objective Narration 
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 Since the opening up and reform, China gradually opened its door to the world by 
reforming its domestic and foreign economic policy. Most noticeable change is the economic 
reform. After the 18th National People’s Congress in 2013, the world has been waiting for more 
economic reform as people have high expectation for President Xi and Premier Li Keqiang. For 
the past five years, China has pushed for domestic reforms in both trade and financial sectors. 
Most recently, at the 2018 Bo’ao Forum for Asia, President Xi announced several measures to 
liberalize Chinese economy, including lowering tariffs on imported vehicles and protecting 
intellectual property.128 At the same time, however, there is still state interventions. The Chinese 
government has intervened in the rate of foreign exchange and controlled capital outflow.129 
Both liberal policies and statist measures have been implemented during Xi’s era.  
Despite how policies have developed, China’s economic engagement with the rest of the 
world has always been increasing. In 2017, the total import and export value of China reached 
$4.1 trillion USD.130 During Xi’s era, China’s trade volume (two ways combined) has been 
around $4 trillion USD.131 China and the U.S have been the largest trading partner of each other. 
By 2016, China-U.S. bilateral trade reached $519.6 billion USD, a 40-fold increase compared to 
the start year of opening up and reform.132 Similarly, bilateral trade with the European Union, 
																																																						
128 Everett Rosenfeld and Huileng Tan, "China's Xi Announces Plans to 'open' China, including Lowering Tariffs on 
Imported Autos," CNBC, April 9, 2018, accessed April 11, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/09/chinese-
president-xi-jinping-speaks-at-boao-forum-for-asia.html.  
129 Scott Kennedy and Elizabeth C. Economy, "US-China Economic Relations: Toward a Genuine Win-Win 
Outcome," in Joint US-China Think Tank Project on the Future of US-China Relations: An American 
Perspective (2017), 11, July 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/joint-us-china-think-tank-project-future-us-china-
relations. 
130 "Brief Statistics on China’s Import & Export in December, 2017," Ministry of Commerce of the People's 
Republic of China, January 20, 2018, accessed April 1, 2018, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/BriefStatistics/201804/20180402733509.shtml.  
131 "China Trade Summary," World Bank, accessed April 15, 2018, 
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/Year/LTST/Summary.  
132 "Brief Statistics on China’s Import & Export in December, 2017," Ministry of Commerce of the People's 
Republic of China. 
  57 
Russia, and major blocs of the world have also had a comparable increase. And China enjoyed a 
trade surplus in most of these relationships. 
 In addition to bilateral progress, the Chinese government has also promoted several 
multilateral mechanisms to globalize its economy, including both economic initiatives and 
multilateral institutions. Briefly introduced in the multilateral diplomacy dimension, China 
joined the WTO and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 2001, starting to 
participate in the global economic order and integrate into the world economy. As the Chinese 
economy grew rapidly, China co-initiated the BRICs (later BRICS) in 2006, and then put 
forward BRI and AIIB in 2013. In November 2017, the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership, which comprises ASEAN countries, China and five other regional countries, had its 
first Leaders’ Summit, which is a serious step towards its conclusion of negotiations.133 In these 
efforts, China has gone through a transition from a participant of the global economy to a leader 
in fewer than two decades.  
China has also pushed for the internationalization of its currency, the Remminbi (RMB). 
When China first tried to add its currency to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket in 2010, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rejected its request.134 After President Xi came into 
office, along with the Chinese government, he has launched a global campaign to reform the 
international monetary system. In 2015, the IMF finally accepted the RMB into the SDR basket 
and gave 10.92 percent of the weight to RMB.135 The reassignment made the Chinese RMB the 
																																																						
133 "RCEP Member Countries to Have Their First Summit Meeting This Month," Business Korea, November 07, 
2017, accessed April 15, 2018, http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=19749.  
134 Hongying Wang, "China and the International Monetary System," Foreign Affairs, December 19, 2017, accessed 
April 15, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2017-12-19/china-and-international-monetary-system.  
135 Ibid. 
  58 
third largest currency in SDR, smaller than the U.S. dollar and the euro but larger than the yen 
and the British pound.  
 
2. The Chinese Perspective 
 Peaceful development has been the central theme of Chinese foreign policy. To China, its 
peaceful development is the key to China’s success in the past four decades. The Chinese 
government has tried to strive for economic globalization so that it could achieve a win-win 
situation. In many occasions, Chinese President Xi Jinping has stressed the importance of 
globalization. In September 2015, Xi delivered a speech in Seattle, addressing the importance of 
reinforcing win-win cooperation.136 During the 2016 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in 
Hangzhou, he stressed the necessity to expedite the process of economic globalization.137 At the 
2017 Davos World Economic Forum, Xi said, “in the face of both opportunities and challenges 
of economic globalization, the right thing to do is to seize every opportunity, jointly meet 
challenges and chart the right course for economic globalization.”138 Xi’s speeches meant that 
China’s economic engagement with the rest of the world is of ultimate importance to China.   
Having the determination in mind, the world now faces three critical issues according to 
President Xi, including first, a lack of robust driving forces for global growth, second, inadequate 
global economic governance, and third, uneven global development.139 Existing global 
institutions and economic orders are not able to catch up with the changes in new industrial and 
economic landscape. The Chinese economic actions are attempts to solve these problems. 
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China’s domestic economic reform strives for “a dynamic, innovation-drive growth model” in 
China; furthering bilateral trade creates a win-win situation; launching new economic initiatives 
as well as institutions and pushing for internationalization of RMB create a more equitable and 
inclusive global economic model.140 With economic links, the world would be bounded closer 
and a community of common destiny would come to fruition. 
China believes that its economic view will create a positive sum result that is better off 
for all than the zero sum game played by the Trump Administration. China believed that the rise 
of the emerging markets means that they received less representation of voices than what they 
should have received. To experts in China, the U.S. should be fully aware that post-World War II 
global economic order has favored itself the most, and it is time for China to correct it.141 
 
3. The American Perspective 
 The U.S. believes that, after China’s opening up and reform, it has achieved a certain 
level of economic reform and liberalization. America, China, and the rest of the world have 
benefited from it. However, the speed and extent of the reform have not met Washington’s 
expectations. SOEs continued to receive subsidies from the government; exchange rate of 
currency has been intervened; capital flow is still controlled. Although China’s reform is still 
undergoing and more liberal measures are said to unfold, many have called them “too little, too 
late.”142 There is a stronger consensus in the U.S. that China should liberalize its economy more 
and closely follow its commitment to the rules of the WTO and its bilateral trade agreements 
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with the United States. Otherwise, the U.S. should employ necessary measures to ensure that 
China follows those requirements, including shifting from a strategy of general cooperation to 
conditional or constrained cooperation, mostly in trade, investment and high-tech sectors.143  
In addition, as China became more technologically advanced, the U.S. and China have 
become more substitutive than complementary. The U.S. has been accusing that China has not 
been following the rules of the WTO and that China has been profiting from its violation. 
According to the 2017 National Security Strategy, China has stolen the intellectual property of 
the U.S. at a level of hundreds of billions dollars per year.144 As two prominent American 
scholars, Scott Kennedy and Elizabeth Economy said, “what was once the ballast of the 
relationship has increasingly becoming a source of growing tensions. The two economies appear 
less complementary and increasingly competitive.”145 The increasing sense of competitiveness 
and the growing sense of unfairness jointly produce a tougher stance on China.   
 On China’s multilateral cooperation and institutions, China believes that it has had 
strategic gains from its unfair trade practices and investment with Europe.146 In a similar vein, 
China has also dominated its trade relationships with emerging markets and developing 
countries. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy called for providing alternatives of 
economic partners to these countries by promoting American goods and services.147 Regarding 
China’s request to join the SDR basket, the U.S. believes that the Chinese fiscal and monetary 
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systems do not meet the standard to be included. Instead, it asks China to further its economic 
liberalization and reform.148  
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Chapter 4 – The Case of the South China Sea 
 The last two chapters have set up the background to conduct a joint theoretical and 
empirical analysis of the Chinese and American perceptions on the Chinese foreign policy. In 
this chapter and next, two cases in different spheres of Chinese foreign policy will be examined. 
This chapter will focus on the case of the South China Sea. The next chapter will focus on the 
Belt and Road Initiative.  
 The South China Sea was selected as the first case because tensions between the 
American and Chinese perceptions involve multiple dimensions discussed in the last chapter. 
The South China Sea is a strategically crucial sea line of communication, connecting countries 
from the Middle East to Northeast Asia. Such a passage not only influences both China’s and 
America’s relations with regional countries but also determines the security paradigm in the 
region. The political wrestling between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea is a 
microcosm of that in the Asia-Pacific. Further, the Hague ruling over the case of The Republic of 
the Philippines V. The People’s Republic of China reflects that the outcome of the South China 
Sea disputes sheds light on the effectiveness of current multilateral institutions and the 
development of future global governance. Existing international institutions are not able to 
bridge the gap between American and Chinese perceptions. 
 With the strategic importance of the South China Sea in mind, this chapter will first 
recount major steps China has taken since the South China Sea became contentious in the 2010s. 
Then both Chinese and American perceptions on Chinese rhetoric and action will be introduced, 
analyzed, and compared. I will single out reasons that led to different perceptions, examine 
whether misperceptions exist, and figure out how different perceptions undermine Sino-U.S. 
relations. Lastly, I will give my recommendations on what both countries can do to reduce 
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misperceptions and bridge the gap between different perceptions, which, in turn, will strengthen 
Sino-U.S. relations in a time of tension.  
 
I. Unfolding China’s Actions in the South China Sea 
 Historically, the South China Sea has been at the center of Sino-U.S. relations, with both 
direct and indirect conflict between the two countries. An example of direct tension was the 
Hainan Island incident. In 2001, a Chinese J-8II interceptor fighter collided with a U.S. EP-3 
intelligence aircraft in the South China Sea, resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot and the 
forced landing of the American aircraft in Hainan, China. Tensions escalated until a letter was 
delivered from the U.S. ambassador in China to the Chinese foreign minister. The letter was 
written ambiguously, with the intention that either side could interpret in its own favor. Tensions 
gradually defused as the translation from English to Chinese gave enough leeway for both 
countries retain their diplomatic dignity.  
More often, indirect conflict takes the form of tensions between China and U.S. security 
allies and partners in the region. Conflictual territorial claims over the South China Sea islands 
among neighboring countries have existed for a long time. Rich natural resources in the ocean 
and the waterway’s strategic importance have contributed to tensions among these nations, since 
the South China Sea has proven reserve of seven billion barrels of oil and 900 trillion cubic feet 
of natural gas, and a third of global shipping goes through it.149 Currently, six countries and 
regions, including China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Brunei, hold 
sovereignty claims over the islands. Among all the islands and reefs, the Spratly Islands (Chinese 
																																																						
149 Beina Xu, "South China Sea Tensions," Council on Foreign Relations, May 14, 2014, accessed April 05, 2018, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/south-china-sea-tensions; "How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea? | 
China Power Project." How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea? October 27, 2017. Accessed April 05, 2018. 
https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/.  
  64 
name Nansha), Paracel Islands (Xisha), Pratas Islands (Dongsha), Macclesfield Bank 
(Zhongsha), and Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Dao) are most contentious.  
Long-standing conflicts reemerged and have been exacerbated gradually since 2011, 
when China believed an Indian vessel intruded into Chinese territory. In April 2012, the 
Philippine Navy detained some Chinese fishermen who were harvesting in disputed waters. In 
response, China took control and blocked the Scarborough Shoal’s lagoon and prevented 
Philippine ships from resting. Three months later, China created a new city, Sansha, to govern 
the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratly Islands.150  
In January 2013, the Philippines brought up a compulsory arbitration against China under 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In the month after, China 
returned the Philippines’ note verbale and expressed its non-acceptance and non-participation 
stance regarding the case.151 In December 2014, China published its Position Paper on the South 
China Sea arbitration. The Position Paper stated China’s position that the Arbitral Tribunal did 
not have jurisdiction over the case brought by the Philippines because “the subject-matter is 
territorial sovereignty over several maritime features,” which does not fall within the jurisdiction 
of the UNCLOS declaration filed by China.152 On July 12, 2016, the court ruled unanimously in 
favor of the Philippines. Two days later, the Chinese foreign ministry published another report 
rejecting the ruling of the tribunal court. 
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 Despite China’s rejection of the Hague ruling, China has continued its endeavors to solve 
maritime disputes through bilateral negotiations with other involved parties. In the initial 
aftermath of the Hague ruling, China prevented ASEAN countries from collectively criticizing 
China by selectively approaching some members of ASEAN to block the joint criticism. Two 
weeks after the Hague ruling, Cambodia stepped forward in an ASEAN meeting to block a joint 
statement criticizing China.153 Later, China’s rapprochement with the Philippines became evident 
when, as the 2017 ASEAN, the Philippines avoided mentioning China’s reclamation and 
construction activities in the South China Sea.154 In May 2017, China and ASEAN reached a 
framework for a code of conduct (COC) for the disputed South China Sea. This code of conduct 
is seen as a continuation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties (DOC) in the 
South China Sea.155  
During Beijing’s contact with Manila, two issues are especially important: island 
reclamation and island construction. Through negotiations, China agreed to Philippine’s proposal 
that neither side reclaims more islands.156 Nonetheless, new construction is not completely 
solved. In August 2017, China protested to the Philippines for new construction on a sandbar in 
the Spratly Islands. Three months later, Philippine President Duterte halted the construction.157 
In comparison, China continued its construction on Fiery Cross Reef (Yongshu Jiao) and showed 
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footage of its transformation on China Central Television, China’s state-controlled television 
broadcaster.158 Despite the Philippines’ protest, the Chinese government claimed that the 
construction was intended to improve disaster prevention capability for civil use.159  
In addition to military buildups on maritime features, China has used its navy and air 
force for shows of force in the South China Sea and nearby waters. China’s sole aircraft carrier 
Liaoning has conducted several drills in the South China Sea and sailed into the Western Pacific. 
The H-6K heavy bombers have taken similar trips and patrolled near disputed islands. In 
response to China’s actions, and to ensure American interests, the U.S. Navy started the first 
freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in October 2015.160  In 2016 and 2017, the U.S. 
conducted three and four U.S. FONOPs, respectively.161 Again, in January 2018, U.S. Destroyer 
USS Hopper conducted a FONOP within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal.162 This is the 
fifth FONOP since the Hague ruling rejected China’s territorial claim over the man-made 
islands. In response, China has taken both diplomatic and security measures. Spokespersons of 
China’s foreign ministry have repeatedly accused the U.S. of illegal entrance into Chinese waters 
and of threatening regional stability.163 In addition, Chinese vessels shadowed the U.S. ships 
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when they conducted FONOPs.164 Overall, the PLA Navy and Air Force have increased their 
presence in the South China Sea. 
 
II. Chinese and American Perceptions  
Chinese Perception  
 The Chinese government believes that it has sovereignty rights, since ancient times, over 
the islands, shoals, and reefs in the South China Sea within the Nine-Dash Line. The Chinese 
people claim to be the first to “discover, name, explore and exploit the resources” of the South 
China Sea.165 China thus argues it has legitimate reasons to build both civilian and military 
facilities on these maritime features, and send coast guard, air force, and navy personnel to patrol 
the water. For those maritime features claimed by China but not under Chinese control, China 
proposes that bilateral negotiations should be the means to solve the problem.166 Beijing believes 
that non-regional parties should not be involved in regional issues as they may complicate the 
situation. Upholding a rule-based order in the South China Sea while hoping to address the issue 
bilaterally, China hopes that the U.S. would support the negotiation of COC. 
 In keeping with this, China believes that its non-acceptance and non-participation attitude 
towards the compulsory arbitration brought up by the Philippines is legitimate. Two reasons 
stand out, other than China’s preference for bilateral negotiations. On the one hand, China 
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believes that the temporary Hague court under UNCLOS has no jurisdiction over the case 
because, in 2006, China turned in a statement opting out of compulsory arbitration in accordance 
with UNCLOS.167 On the other hand, China sees UNCLOS as inapplicable to the behaviors 
about which the Philippines has concerns, since UNCLOS only has jurisdiction over limited 
issues, such as the exclusive economic zone, freedom of navigation, and environmental 
protection. China argues that the issues brought up by the Philippines involve delimitation that 
falls outside of the UNCLOS jurisdiction.168 Thus, China rejects the Hague ruling as null and 
void.  
 The Chinese government hopes that the U.S. will honor its commitment not to take sides 
in territorial disputes. However, it feels that the U.S. presence near the South China Sea, such as 
the visit of the USS Carl Vinson to Vietnam and the troops stationed in the Philippines, supports 
the territorial claims of American allies and friends in the region by a show of force, and “drags 
China into a geopolitical competition.”169 In regard to America’s FONOPs and other missions in 
the nearby waters, China deems U.S. actions a disturbance of regional peace and stability.170 The 
Chinese government believes that the U.S. should help create a peaceful and congenial 
environment for China and other regional parties to solve their conflicts bilaterally, instead of 
raising tensions in the region by conducting provocative exercises, proposing joint patrolling 
with neighboring countries, or sailing within 12 nautical miles of China’s maritime holdings. 
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Although Chinese scholars believe that both Washington and Beijing share a common interest in 
sea lane safety and freedom of navigation, they do not think that the current US actions are de-
escalating. Many prominent Chinese scholars warn of the possibility of “a shared worst 
outcome,” a direct military confrontation.171 A military engagement is not beneficial to either 
side. The U.S. should seek ways to reform the international order in order to include and 
collaborate with China in a time of rapid change.172 
 In its 2017 Defense White Paper, China cited, “misunderstandings and lack of mutual 
trust” as impediments to regional countries working collaboratively.173 Although traditional 
security concerns are hard to make a significant breakthrough, China identified several fields in 
non-traditional maritime security threats in which both should collaborate, including 
environmental disaster, piracy, smuggling, and drug trafficking, should be dealt with jointly by 
regional forces.  
 
American Perception 
 Fundamental U.S. interests in the South China Sea are “the free flow of commerce, the 
maintenance of a rules-based order government by international laws and norms, and the ability 
of countries in the region to make their own strategic choices.”174 As a maritime power with 
several territories in the Pacific, the United States sees itself inseparable from any issues in the 
Asia-Pacific. This, without any doubt, includes America’s participation in the issues regarding 
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the South China Sea. A secure, stable, and open order is in America’s interests.175 American 
scholars often express their concern that, by claiming that Asian security should be decided by 
Asians, China tries to push the U.S. out of the South China Sea, which threatens U.S. interests in 
the region.176 
 Regarding Chinese responses to the Philippines’ behavior prior to the onset of the South 
China Sea case, Thomas Christensen, a Princeton professor and former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs saw China’s actions as opportunistic, to the 
extent that it seems that “Beijing is waiting for provocations by others to legitimize Chinese 
actions that will consolidate control over the islands that China has claimed for decades but not 
administered in the past.”177 With regard to the Hague ruling under UNCLOS, although the U.S. 
is not a formal signatory, it treats UNCLOS an international law that binds signatories. As then-
Assistant Secretary John Kirby said, “the United States expresses its hope and expectation that 
both parties will comply with their obligations.”178 With China’s defiance over the Hague ruling, 
the U.S. believes that China is challenging the rules-based maritime order. Since 2015, U.S. 
Navy has conducted about a dozen FONOPs, signaling America’s heightened alert to the 
openness and stability of the region.  
 Disagreement on international law has worried the U.S. because not only the U.S. 
believes that China’s violation undermines the regional order, but also because current 
international laws, most importantly UNCLOS, cannot provide a guidance of action to which 
both countries agree. The U.S. worries about the recent construction on the Chinese-controlled 
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maritime features, as well as the PLA’s patrols in the waters, some of which have tailgated U.S. 
FONOPs battleships. Washington views these actions destabilizing. Vice Admiral Phillip Sawyer 
of the U.S. Seventh Fleet said in early 2018 that the U.S. defense circles are concerned because 
they do not know what China is doing in the bases on those islands and reefs.179 Yet, Washington 
sees these actions inherently dangerous because it could undermine the freedom of navigation 
and the safety of sea lines of communication in the South China Sea.180  
 In addition to growing direct military competition in the region, the U.S. is also 
concerned about China’s relations with other regional parties and about its major security allies’ 
and friends’ strength in the region. Washington worries that, while its interests are challenged by 
China, regional countries are not able to decide their fates on their own. This is reflected by 
Washington’s determination to improve its security ties, most notably with the Philippines and 
Vietnam. In 2014, the U.S. and the Philippines signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation 
Agreement that allows U.S. troops to return to the country.181 Prior to the accession of current 
Philippines President Duterte, the Philippines was the main intermediator through which the U.S. 
was involved in regional issues. After Duterte bandwagoned with China, however, Vietnam 
became the U.S.’s new regional partner. In early 2018, the USS Carl Vinson became the first 
American aircraft carrier to visit Vietnam since the Vietnam War.182 These actions signal to 
Beijing that Washington has growing concerns along several dimensions in the South China Sea. 
 
																																																						
179 Steven Stashwick, "China Dismissive of US Carrier Visit to Vietnam," The Diplomat, March 14, 2018, accessed 
March 21, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/china-dismissive-of-us-carrier-visit-to-vietnam/. 
180 Green, Bush, and Rapp-Hooper, "Asia-Pacific Security Issues in the U.S.-China Relationship," 24-37. 
181 Ankit Panda, "US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement Bolsters 'Pivot to Asia'," The 
Diplomat, April 29, 2014, accessed March 1, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/us-philippines-enhanced-
defense-cooperation-agreement-bolsters-pivot-to-asia.  
182 Steven Stashwick, "China Dismissive of US Carrier Visit to Vietnam," The Diplomat, March 14, 2018, accessed 
March 21, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/china-dismissive-of-us-carrier-visit-to-vietnam/.  
  72 
III. The Assessment of Perceptions and Misperceptions 
 Using the theoretical model that we developed in Chapter 2, we will look into whether 
Chinese perceptions and U.S. perceptions reflect a clear assessment of China’s actions in the 
South China Sea. We find that the variables that govern either perception are different. Most 
notably, the history variable matters to China significantly while anything but history variable 
matters to the U.S. perception. We will also examine whether these perceptions might fall into 
different categories of misperceptions. 
 The history, power, and change of rules or norms variables dictate Chinese perceptions 
over its actions in the South China Sea. Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, 
Beijing’s maritime experience vis-a-vis the U.S. has not been a pleasant one. The U.S. seventh 
fleet once barricaded Beijing from crossing the Taiwan Strait and reunifying both sides of the 
strait. The Hainan Island incident refreshed Beijing’s memory that Chinese naval and air forces 
have always been disadvantaged relative to the U.S. navy and air force. With such an impression, 
Beijing has been insecure about facing the security challenges in the South China Sea. Building 
up its strength with maritime features, and dispatching regular air force, naval, and coast guard 
patrols, serve two ends for Beijing. First, these actions showcase China’s improved military 
capability. Second, they underscore Beijing’s intention to safeguard sovereignty over the 
disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea. China also perceives its rejection of the Hague 
ruling as legitimate, because it believes that its right of non-participation of compulsory 
arbitration over sovereignty issues was granted after it submitted its declaration to the United 
Nations. This action is consistent with the legitimate use of international laws to protect its own 
interests. Thus, it does not believe its rejection of the Hague ruling should be deemed a violation 
or a threat to a rules-based order. 
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 American perceptions are mostly shaped by considerations of power, identity, change of 
norms, and information. The U.S. has witnessed a stronger Chinese presence in the South China 
Sea. Freedom of navigation was never an issue prior to China’s military modernization. As the 
Chinese navy and air force become more capable, Washington has become concerned about its 
reduced military advantage. This is especially worrisome for military leaders and security 
analysts, as they deem capability more important than intention. However, even for diplomats 
who care more about intentions, China’s statements, like “Asians decides Asian affairs,” send a 
message that U.S. interests in the South China Sea are not primary. Further, China’s non-
participation and non-acceptance of the Hague ruling and heighten America’s perception of 
threat, as this is a violation of existing norms and rules. China’s rejection of the international 
ruling, despite China’s belief that the Hague was incorrect, sends a signal to the U.S. that there 
would not be a lower bond that by which China will abide. In light of this, the U.S. is more likely 
to base its perception of the threat China poses on China’s capability than its intentions. Last but 
not least, lack of transparency in recent construction on Chinese maritime features exacerbates 
tensions between the two countries: that new construction apparently could serve military 
purposes changes the U.S. perception.  
 Comparing Chinese and American perceptions, it seems that, while China deems its 
power not strong enough to safeguard its sovereignty claims, the U.S. sees China as powerful 
enough to undermine international—and American—freedom of navigation and the sea lines of 
communication. As security seekers, both the U.S. and China are vulnerable to the security 
dilemma. China’s actions are defensive in Beijing’s perspective. However, a different 
understanding of sovereignty the rights it generates gives rise to the security dilemma. The U.S. 
may find China’s patrols, especially those that tailgated U.S. battleships, disturbing. However, 
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we have to understand that a fundamental difference between China and the U.S. is that “[China] 
is a land power developing its naval capabilities, [whereas America is] a maritime power coming 
onshore.”183 The countries are seeing the same actions through different lenses. The current 
international law and institutions fail to resolve the security dilemma as both of them have 
incompatible views of UNCLOS and the Hague court. The current non-binding rules, thus, are 
unable to either restrain China’s action in the water or provide legal support for China’s action 
that convinces America.  
 In addition to security dilemma, another potential heuristic filter of misperception is the 
influence of fears. China’s capacity has increased significantly, though various American reports 
have exaggerated China’s increasing military capacity. The PLA’s rapid modernization generates 
fears in Washington’s inner circles, as the U.S. is afraid of losing global hegemony and being 
challenged regionally. Such fears also lead to overestimating one’s importance. A commonly 
held view in American defense circles is that many Chinese military actions in the South China 
Sea are targeted at the U.S., though China never explicitly stated in that way.184 The reality is 
that China would strengthen its control over its claimed territory no matter who was involved in 
these disputed issues; its actions are not a response to the United States. 
 
IV. Policy Recommendation 
 Based on the perceptions and misperceptions discussed earlier, several recommendations 
for either the U.S., China, or both are proposed here to ensure a stable South China Sea in the 
																																																						
183 Zhu, Huang, and Hu, "Competing Perspectives between China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific and the 
Path for Mitigation," 34.  
184 Finkelstein, Saunders, and Schriver, "The Military and Defense Dimensions of United States Relations with 
China," 34-37.  
  75 
near future. These policy recommendations are proposed as examples of how to reduce threat 
perception. Bear in mind that some of them may not be easily implemented. 
1. Don’t let defense leaders and security analysts dictate the South China Sea issues and 
solutions. Security experts generally focus more on capability than intention. As China’s 
military capability increases, defense circles in America are generally likely to worry. 
Diplomats and politicians should lead the discussions on finding common ground and 
solutions to reduce South China Sea tensions. This is not a call to neglect security 
interests; a consistent perspective within either side is important. 
2. The bilateral military and security dialogue should be improved both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. Lack of transparency often leads to a perceived threat, as has been true for, 
the United States in this case. Both countries should continue the U.S.-China Diplomatic 
and Security Dialogue, and expand communications of military officials.  
3. Both the U.S. and China should start to negotiate a code of conduct either formally or 
tacitly. As China increases its maritime missions, the two countries’ navies will face each 
other more often. An agreed code of conduct will reduce the possibility of 
miscommunication that may lead to an escalation of tensions at the tactical level. This 
code must be more binding than the DOC or existing international laws. Both the U.S. 
and China should practice its use often once it is agreed upon. Such a code of conduct 
will also help to lower the risks brought by disagreements on interpretations of 
international law.  
4. Beijing should stop using ambiguous language that may reinforce Washington’s 
misperceptions. Language that may infringe U.S. interests should be avoided so long as 
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Chinese interests are not hurt. Legitimate U.S. interests should be recognized by China at 
appropriate times.  
5. China should continue to carry out direct bilateral negotiations with ASEAN and regional 
countries to formulate a COC that does not seriously challenge the interests of the U.S. 
During the negotiations, China should not put the U.S. in a situation where the U.S. has 
to either uphold its allies’ and friends’ interests while contradicting China’s interests or 
violate its security commitment. China should avoid posing such a hard binary choice for 
the U.S. The U.S., in turn, should encourage direct bilateral dialogue among involved 
parties and encourage a congenial environment for carrying out the conversation. 
6. Both the U.S. and China should cooperate in non-traditional maritime challenges such as 
anti-piracy, environmental degradation, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions. 
These activities will help both navies to formulate shared identity in regional governance 
and reduce hostility.  
 
As the Sino-U.S. Shanghai Communiqué said in 1972, “Neither the U.S. nor China 
should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each is opposed to efforts by any other 
country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.”185 Both the U.S. and China have 
realized that a stable South China Sea is vital for their interests. Each should give the other more 
space to maneuver and work on step-by-step measures to reduce risks of conflict. If the tension 
in the South China Sea can be reduced gradually, this will be a helpful precedent for resolving 
conflictual interests in broader issues and in other dimensions as well.  
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Chapter 5 – The Case of the Belt and Road Initiative 
The last chapter is devoted to a security case. This chapter will analyze a development 
case, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is China’s flagship policy since President Xi 
came into office. BRI is a useful case for several reasons. First, the size of BRI as a single and 
coherent foreign policy and initiative is unprecedented in Chinese history. Second, BRI is not 
only a development proposal, but its successful implementation also involves security and 
multilateral organizations dimensions. The creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB), the major financing source for BRI, poses a challenge to the existing web of global 
development institutions. Security components that ensure Chinese investment and constructions 
abroad, including China’s military base in Djibouti, have also received wide global attention. 
Last but not least, BRI embodies the so-called Chinese philosophy for global governance and 
development. It is important to look into whether China’s philosophy accurately describes 
Chinese actions, and whether America’s concerns about China’s philosophy are legitimate. 
This chapter begins with a roadmap of the development of BRI. Next, both Chinese and 
American perceptions will be outlined, followed by an analysis of major variables and heuristic 
factors that explain the consolidation of both perceptions and their differences. In the end, some 
aspirational policy recommendations are given based on the analysis of perception and 
misperception.  
 
I. Unfolding China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
 Originally named the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative, BRI—comprised of “the Silk 
Road Economic Belt” and “the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road”—was put forward by Chinese 
President Xi Jinping in Astana, Kazakhstan, and Jakarta, Indonesia, in September and October 
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2013. BRI proposed five links that integrate the Eurasian landmass. They include policy 
coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-
people communication.186 These links reflect Beijing’s vision that combines both soft 
connections like policy cooperation and hard connections including transcontinental networks. 
These connections are divided mainly into six economic corridors: China-Mongolia-Russia 
Economic Corridor, New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor, China-Central Asia-West 
Asia Economic Corridor, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
Economic Corridor, China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor.187 Soon after its 
announcement, BRI has reached the center of the Chinese government’s work plan. According to 
a comprehensive study done by Nadège Rolland, a scholar at National Bureau of Asian 
Research,  
 
[In a few months after the announcement of BRI, China] had rallied international support 
and begun to secure significant financial resources, created a central supervisory group, 
published a roadmap, mobilized the very best Chinese experts and intellectuals, 
embarked on an aggressive soft-power business representatives to sign hundreds of 
agreements and memoranda of understanding (MOU) promising more trade opportunities 
and Chinese investment in neighboring countries.188 
 
China has mobilized a huge amount of political, financial, technical, and human resources at 
different administrative levels to get BRI started.  
A month after Xi’s speeches in Jakarta, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China acknowledged its importance to the whole 
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nation.189 In February 2015, a central leading small group was created to advance the 
development of the Belt and Road.190 In the month following, BRI appeared in the 2015 State 
Council’s report presented to the National People’s Congress during the “two sessions.”191 In the 
report, BRI is said to be a top priority in the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). On March 28, 
2015, a document named “Visions and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (Visions and Actions)” was published.192 Beijing assigned 
different policy objectives to different industries and sectors of the society, making BRI more 
than a development initiative. During the 19th Party Congress in late 2017, BRI was enshrined 
into the constitution of the Communist Party of China, along with the superior leadership of Xi 
Jinping.193 
Most prominently, several financing institutions have been erected to support the flagship 
initiative. Officially launched in June 2015, AIIB gathered 57 founding countries, among which 
18 are European nations.194 Despite U.S. warnings, major European countries including Britain, 
France, Germany, and Italy became signatories at AIIB’s opening ceremony.195 In March 2017, 
another 13 countries and regions joined AIIB. As of March 2018, AIIB has 42 regional members, 
22 non-regional members, and 20 perspective members located in all continents.196 China 
committed $100 billion and took 26 percent of voting power, enough to veto major decisions at 
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AIIB but not sufficient to block specific lending decisions.197 Besides AIIB, China also secured 
$100 billion from the New Development Bank created by and for the BRICS countries. Apart 
from multilateral financing, China has also mobilized its domestic resources to support its 
flagship initiative. Drawing from its foreign reserve and its policy banks, China created the Silk 
Road Fund that will allegedly provide $40 billion to profitable mid- and long-term projects.198 
China’s policy banks—the Export-Import Bank of China and China Development Bank—will 
also invest in major projects abroad based on the necessity of development goals. According to a 
study by the American Enterprise Institute, China has reached more than $138 billion USD in 
foreign investment, $208 billion USD in construction projects overseas since 2014.199 
 To China, efforts in multilateral diplomacy and security dimensions safeguard BRI’s 
success. The Chinese government has launched a global campaign for BRI. Each year since 
2014, one of BRI participants would host the annual international Silk Road Forum. Istanbul, 
Madrid, and Warsaw are the host countries for the years 2014 to 2016, respectively.200 In May 
2017, an upgraded Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, attended by 29 heads of 
state or government, representatives of more than 70 international organizations, and delegates 
from more than 130 nations, was hosted in Beijing.201 In addition, other international events such 
as Media Cooperation Forum on Belt and Road and the Silk Road International Film Festival 
have become channels through which BRI is promoted.202  
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 Security-wise, China has built up its naval base at Djibouti near the Djibouti City, and 
officially opened it on August 1, 2017. Located near the Gulf of Aden where the busiest 
maritime routes cross, the Djibouti base is said to be able to provide logistic support for the PLA 
Navy.203 Although this is the first Chinese naval base abroad, the PLA Navy has involved in 
escort missions in the Gulf of Aden for more than a decade. A strengthened PLA Navy presence 
in the Indian Ocean would protect Chinese investment and constructions along the 21st Maritime 
Silk Road.  
 
II. Chinese and American Perceptions Compared 
Chinese Perception 
 According to the “Visions and Actions,” the Belt and Road Initiative is inherently 
beneficial towards all countries involved.204 The Chinese government highlights BRI’s potential 
as a win-win cooperation. Infrastructure is fundamental towards the development of a region. For 
countries being landlocked in the center of Eurasia, BRI’s infrastructure building helps connect 
Asian, European, and African countries. With transportation, telecommunication, and energy 
integration, BRI will unleash the market potential of its participants. Natural resources from 
Central Asian countries will have a larger market once they are able to be transported to major 
sea lines of communication. As President Xi Jinping said at the World Economic Forum at 
Davos in 2017, “Chinese companies have made over 50 billion US dollars of investment and 
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launched a number of major projects in the countries along the routes, spurring the economic 
development of these countries and creating many local jobs.”205  
In addition, the Chinese government believes that the connectivity among BRI countries 
will “align and coordinate [their] development strategies.”206 For example, the existence of         
Eurasian Economic Union reflects that Russia has its development vision of Central Asian, 
Caucasian, and East European countries. With diplomatic efforts, the Chinese government was 
able to reach a “joint statement on cooperation in coordinating the development of the Silk Road 
Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union” with Russia. The 2017 Belt and Road Forum 
served a similar purpose. According to China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, the Forum 
is a good chance to “pool more consensus,” “identify cooperation directions,” and “improve [a] 
supporting system [that is capable of effectively coordinating among BRI nations].”207 Beijing 
does not wish to promote BRI by sacrificing the interests of other countries and other policies. 
Instead, Beijing sees BRI being capable of aligning the interests of different countries.  
That being said, Chinese officials do not believe that China is exerting its influence 
globally either by monopolizing the benefits or by exporting its political and economic model. 
Yang Jiechi, CCP’s Politburo member and China’s State Councilor, openly stated that “China 
does not intend to monopolize all the benefits or even take the lion's share, but will work with 
partner countries to make the pie bigger and divide it equitably.”208 To Beijing, a better way to 
characterize the relationship is that Beijing is trying to build a community of common destiny 
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where the fate of all countries involved is associated with the success of BRI. As Shi Zhiqin, a 
Resident Scholar at Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, said, “the central principles [of] 
collaboration, building, and result-sharing… [demonstrate that] China is a responsible global 
player in the international society.”209 
Taking a step forward, Beijing believes that BRI and its financing agencies are 
supplementary to the existing global order, and can co-exist with current institutions. On the one 
hand, China labels BRI as a proponent of globalization and free trade. According to the “Visions 
and Actions,” BRI “is designed to uphold the global free trade regime and the open world 
economy in the spirit of open regional cooperation.”210 On the other hand, the Chinese 
government views BRI and AIIB as a proper adjustment to inefficiencies in the existing 
institutions. From Chapter 3 we learned that the Chinese government considers the post-World 
War II institutions most comprehensive. Nonetheless, the Chinese government is not satisfied 
with the weight of representation for emerging markets in traditional institutions. At an informal 
meeting among BRICS leaders during the 2016 Hangzhou G20 Summit, President Xi believes 
that emerging markets should “actively promote reform in the governance structure of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and increase the representation and voice of 
emerging markets and developing countries.”211  
 
American Perception 
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 The Chinese perception of BRI highlights the mutually beneficial nature of BRI. 
However, American experts generally hold a more pessimistic view towards the economic profit 
BRI could bring to other nations. In a most recent report published in March 2018, Derek 
Scissors and Cecilia Joy-Perez, two Chinese economy experts at the American Enterprise 
Institute, are two among many who share such a concern. They worry whether China’s partners 
will benefit much from BRI projects, and whether China is able to carry out the Initiative in the 
long run. According to their estimation, “BRI is better understood as construction projects worth 
hundreds of billions of dollars taken on by state-owned enterprises (SOEs).”212 They believe that 
most BRI projects are construction projects rather than investment, in which Chinese money is 
used to hire Chinese contractors. They worry that these projects may not create as many jobs for 
local people as promised by the Chinese government. In addition, most money came out from 
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The debt of the Chinese government and SOEs 
combined has accumulated to about 150% of Chinese GDP, which is not a stable level of 
government debt.213 Nonetheless, other scholars, including Melanie Hart, Elizabeth C. Economy, 
and Paul Gewirtz, believe that BRI has the potential to change the Eurasian landmass, and that 
the U.S. should collaborate with China when possible.214 The U.S. would marginalize itself 
economically if it chooses to totally disregard BRI. Otherwise, the U.S. may lose in the process 
of the change of the economic balance of power internationally, and undermine the leading 
position of the U.S. in the world economy. 
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Toward whether BRI is able to achieve its stated goals, American attitudes are more 
varied, with some believing that it could be beneficial to the region while other saying that it 
stems from selfish ends. Despite different predictions of future outcomes, the American 
perception believes that China has largely downplayed the strategic and security gains China 
could harvest from BRI. Different analyses from the military, major think tanks, and the 
government hold a consensus view that, through BRI, China is able to stabilize its western 
provinces that are threatened by separatist powers, secure energy supply routes from Central 
Asian countries and Russia, establish a larger military presence abroad than before, cultivate a 
stronger than ever political influence to its partners, and pivot away from the pressure exerted by 
America’s rebalance to Asia.215 In fact, America’s concerns over China’s strategic and security 
gains in the region reflect a fundamental assumption that these gains undermine American 
hegemony and its relative advantage over China. As Ely Ratner, a China scholar at Council on 
Foreign Relations, argues, a stronger PLA presence in the region will weaken the determination 
of third parties in the region to cooperate with the U.S. on security matters.216 American allies 
and partners would possibly choose to abandon the U.S. and bandwagon with China for fear that 
the U.S. may not honor its security commitment. 
Besides a direct competition, Washington also showed its concern over the future of 
international institutions and norms. The Obama Administration overtly expressed its concern 
that BRI and AIIB may not meet environmental, labor and governance standards of existing 
																																																						
215 2017 congress report on China; Ely Ratner, "Geostrategic and Military Drivers and Implications of the Belt and 
Road Initiative," Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2018, accessed March 18, 2018, 
https://www.cfr.org/report/geostrategic-and-military-drivers-and-implications-belt-and-road-initiative; Joel 
Wuthnow, Securing China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Dimensions and Implications, Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, U.S. National Defense University, January 25, 2018, accessed March 28, 2018, 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Wuthnow_USCC Testimony_20180123.pdf; 
Wuthnow, "Chinese Perspectives on the Belt Road Initiative: Strategic Rationales, Risks, and Implications."   
216 Ratner, "Geostrategic and Military Drivers and Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative."  
  86 
Western-established institutions.217 Deeply inside, Obama’s worry indicated that, as a new 
institution, AIIB increases China’s leadership status in the global institution system. China’s 
power in international institutions grows despite whether AIIB challenges or supplements the 
existing system.218 AIIB could gain power either by threatening to set up an alternative to the 
current system or by tightly connecting AIIB with the World Bank or the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). With the potential decline in institutional power, the U.S. is worried that the 
application of rules and norms would also change in favor of China and against the interests of 
the United States. In the long run, it could challenge America’s hegemonic power in the field of 
global institutions and order. 
 
III. The Assessment of Perceptions and Misperceptions 
 The Chinese perception of the Belt and Road Initiative is largely benign and beneficial to 
its participants. From the Chinese perspective, BRI should not be deemed threatening to other 
countries mainly for two reasons based on our theoretical framework. First, BRI speaks to the 
identity variable that tries to align the interests of China and other countries. According to 
Rousseau’s study, when countries are able to create a shared identity by having more similarity, 
they should find other countries less likely to have any intention to inflict harms on each other. 
The Chinese perception is largely founded on the concept of reciprocity and mutual benefits. By 
aligning Chinese interests with the interests of other participants, and tying all participants into 
the same boat of BRI, participants should not find reasons that China will set them up, and threat 
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perception should be minimal. Second, China believes that BRI and its funding sources are not a 
change in rules or norms, and that they are able to coexist with current institutions including the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, or the Asian Development Bank.  
 The American perception is mostly grounded in power and information variables. 
Although BRI and AIIB are not mature and large enough to compare with the combination of 
Western-led institutions, their successful initiation, as well as the participation of more than 80 
countries, demonstrates China’s leadership. Washington has witnessed the rise of Chinese 
leadership as a form of political power. Although this does not reveal whether American 
leadership subsides, the relative increase of Chinese power and the narrowing gap between 
American and Chinese power makes Washington nervous. The U.S. is no longer the only post-
Cold War country that is able to set up ultra-regional institutions. In addition, the information 
variable, or the lack of it, increases the threat perception of the United States. Despite China’s 
original intention—whether it aims merely for reciprocal economic gains, or whether it strives 
for the security and strategic gains—the U.S. is likely to consider China’s taciturnity as a sign of 
hiding its true intention. Even if the Chinese government has a benign purpose initially, it could 
be misinterpreted, and thus, thwarted by the United States. 
 Given the analysis of American and Chinese perceptions, there could be several sources 
of misperception. For China, misperception may come from the fact that it fails to attract the 
U.S. through identity similarity. Although China’s strategy of tying everyone in the same boat 
might be successful for participants, the U.S. is not officially a part of BRI or AIIB. The U.S. is 
not an in-group country with regard to China’s position in BRI. Instead, it is an out-group 
country that is opposite to the position of China. China could have downplayed U.S. threat 
perception in the identity variable.  
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 Another source of misperception comes from the lack of spheres of measure. We have 
seen that many American experts are not as optimistic about the economic success of BRI as 
their Chinese counterparts. “All BRI-related documents lack exact figures and detailed 
timeframes.”219 Cognitive dissonance comes into play when there lack specific criteria and 
measures that both China and the U.S. agree on. The existing competitive mentality between the 
U.S. and China, which is the source for dissonance, would make the U.S. interpret Chinese 
actions negatively when their interpretation could go either way.  
 Last but not least, it is possible that the creation of BRI is due to careful consideration of 
the Chinese government to solve its development issues. Instead, the U.S. may overestimate its 
importance in pushing China westward. The rebalance to Asia policy may render China more 
determined in implementing BRI, but China’s Western Development strategy, along with the 
discussion of expanding it into the center of Eurasia, has long been part of the discussion of the 
Chinese government.  
 
IV. Policy Recommendation 
 Based on the difference in American and Chinese perceptions and their assessments, 
several policy recommendations are listed below. Similar to the caveat in the last chapter, these 
policy recommendations aim to lower threat perception. They may face different levels of 
practical constraints when being implemented.  
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1. Previously China has welcomed the U.S. to participate in BRI and AIIB.220 China should 
continue its efforts to invite the U.S. to join AIIB. In the short term, the likelihood for the 
U.S. to join is low. China should try to include the U.S. in subtler ways, such as involving 
the U.S. in some BRI projects, or establishing connection and coordination through future 
conferences like the Belt and Road Forum, which will reduce America’s concerns over 
China’s capacity in upholding environmental and labor standards. China should have 
incentives to ensure a congenial attitude of the U.S. towards its development strategy by 
trying to align the interests of both. 
2. The Trump Administration has shown both interest and contempt in collaborating with 
China on regional development.221 It is not very likely for the U.S. to replicate a similar 
initiative for Eurasia. If the U.S. government wants to put a check on the Chinese 
Initiative, it is easier to achieve it through having international organizations to supervise 
Chinese activities. The U.S. should encourage communication and collaboration between 
existing western-led institutions and Chinese-led AIIB. Existing institutions provide a 
more legitimate channel through which American interests are better preserved.  
3. China should actively seek collaboration between AIIB and the World Bank, the IMF, or 
the ADB. This will also help to address America’s concern that AIIB and BRI may not 
meet the standards of existing institutions. By truly integrating AIIB into existing global 
financing institutions, there will be less of a chance to change global rules or norms, 
which would partially lower Washington’s threat perception.  
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4. Both sides should jointly develop a specific set of criteria measuring the contribution of 
BRI. The U.S. should avoid languages that fully negate BRI’s contribution. Washington 
should judge BRI based on Chinese actions and their results, instead of criticizing it at the 
forefront. The U.S. should understand that such a huge initiative will certainly have 
geopolitical impacts. Yet, if economic development never occurs, strategic and security 
gains would never materialize.  
5. There will be an increasing amount of interactions between the U.S. Navy and the PLA 
Navy near the Gulf of Aden. Both navies should seek opportunities in operational and 
training cooperation under the permit of the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act of 
the United States. 
 
 Unlike the security realm, development strategy is much easier to build a positive sum 
game where both the U.S. and China could achieve a win-win scenario. What is at the center of 
current contention is how the U.S. and China should share the benefits of a globalized world 
economy. Both countries should avoid giving each other incorrect and unnecessary signals that 
distort the perception of each other. Instead, both countries should try to build confidence 
through existing institutions and other mechanisms that can align the interests of both. 
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Chapter 6 – A Solution to U.S.-China Conundrum 
 After examining the two case studies of the Belt and Road Initiative and the South China 
Sea, we have seen different variables that dictate American and Chinese perceptions of Chinese 
foreign policy. Zooming out from specific cases, I will combine the theoretical framework from 
Chapter 2 and the empirical evidence from Chapter 3, and conduct a holistic analysis of the 
American and Chinese perceptions of the Chinese foreign policy across dimensions. In this 
concluding chapter, first, I will explain what variables have influenced the Chinese and 
American perceptions and how. Then, I will compare the differences between both perceptions 
and give out aspirational policy recommendations that could lower threat perceptions and 
potentially contribute to more congenial U.S.-China relations. 
 
I. The Assessment of the Chinese Perception 
 The Chinese perception of its foreign policy is dictated by power, identity, change of 
rules or norms, and history. Information certainly does not influence China’s perception of its 
own foreign policy as they are fully aware of all information that led to its foreign policy. 
Among the four variables that matter, history is the most one. Traditionally, the Chinese 
perception of its foreign policy is deemed as a proper response to its historical experience. In the 
Chinese background section in Chapter 3, we have seen that China has often used the victimhood 
narrative. Thus, the history variable has a huge impact on the Chinese perception of the Chinese 
foreign policy across dimensions. The Chinese perceive that the historical experience has put 
China in an unfavorable position in its foreign relations. The Chinese foreign policy should aim 
to address such an unbalanced situation. Consistent with our findings in the case of the South 
China Sea, we have seen that China has mobilized its historical narration in defending its 
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territorial claims and building up capacity to protect its claims facing different security 
challenges. During the Donglang/Doklam standoff near the Sino-Indian-Bhutanese border, 
Beijing has repeatedly claimed that Donglang/Doklam, along with many other contentious 
territories in the region like South Tibet (more commonly known as Arunachal Pradesh), is part 
of China. Beijing deems its road construction appropriate under its sovereignty claims. In 
addition to the security dimension, the multilateral diplomacy dimension is also heavily 
influenced by the history variable. As the Chinese economy grows, Beijing believes that existing 
global institutions underappreciate the contribution of the Chinese economy and fail to reflect the 
interests of emerging markets. History, thus, not only shapes how the Chinese government thinks 
of its foreign policy, but also serves as a comparison between past and present.  
 Besides the history variable, both the power and the identity variables are also important 
for China. Furthermore, there is a pattern that the power variable is more important for China 
when analyzing Sino-U.S. relations, while the identity variable is more important for China’s 
relations with less powerful countries. Although China acknowledges that its power has been 
increasing, China still deems itself much less powerful than the United States. China believes 
that its military actions are defensive in nature and its institution-building activities are not able 
to replace existing global institutions. Therefore, threat level of its foreign policy should not be 
very high, especially to the United States. At the same time, the Chinese perception also 
mobilized the identity variable in China’s relations with other countries. I use the word 
“mobilize” to characterize its perception because China deliberately highlights the similarities 
between China and other nations while hiding their power gaps. In most of the other bilateral 
relations, China has called for equality among major countries, between developed and 
developing nations, and between big countries and small countries. Nonetheless, objectively 
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speaking, for most Chinese bilateral relations other than Sino-U.S. relations, power asymmetry 
exists and is largely in favor of China. In this case, the Chinese perception deliberately 
overemphasizes the identity variable and understates the power variable. In sum, in terms of 
Sino-U.S. relations, the Chinese perception gives more weight to the power variable in 
explaining why its actions are legitimate. In terms of other bilateral relations, the Chinese 
perception is more identity-driven. 
 This general pattern, however, has an exception, which is in the security dimension. The 
Chinese perception of its security policy is largely dictated by the power variable despite how 
small the other country is. The East China Sea ADIZ is adjacent to South Korea and Japan. The 
South China Sea territorial disputes are with Vietnam, the Philippines, and so on. The road 
construction in Donglang is near the border with Bhutan and India. Although one could argue 
that the United States is better friends with these countries than with China, these countries are 
smaller and less powerful than China. Facing them, China continues to build up its military and 
security capabilities and hope to outrun their military capabilities more. This strategy is very 
likely to fall into the security dilemma. 
 Last but not least, according to the Chinese perception of the change of rules or norms 
variable, its threat level should not be high as well. In the security arena, its rejection of the 
Hague ruling has legal grounds. In multilateral diplomacy and economic development arenas, it 
believes that its institutions and initiatives are complementary to the existing global order. 
BRICS protects the interests of emerging markets. BRI promotes the interests of a region 
neglected by the U.S. and Europe. AIIB provides extra funding that addresses the lack of funding 
in the region. Thus, China argues these actions should not be deemed as a subversion to existing 
global order.  
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II. The Assessment of the American Perception 
 The American perception of the Chinese foreign policy is shaped by power, identity, the 
change of rules or norms, and information variables. The power variable is the most important 
variable for the U.S. perception, as it runs through all dimensions. Because China’s power has 
increased all-around, the threat perception of the U.S. is high. Regarding its bilateral relations, 
the U.S. sees China becoming more and more capable to shape the decision-making of foreign 
countries through a combination of coercion and charm offensive. This reflects that the 
American perception focuses more on the power asymmetry between China and other nations. 
Regarding Chinese foreign policy in security and economic arenas, Washington views that 
Beijing’s policies directly challenge the interests of the U.S. and American hegemony in the 
region. Under such a zero-sum perspective, any Chinese action, from islands reclamation in the 
South China Sea to credit loans to the Philippines, would be deemed challenging to the U.S. 
 The identity variable has also had a huge impact on the American perception. 
Historically, China and the U.S. belong to the communist and capitalist blocs, respectively. As of 
today, although the Communist blocs collapsed almost three decades ago and China is not a true 
communist regime, there is a strong attitude in the U.S. that the U.S. and China do not share a 
single identity, or, that they do not have enough characteristics in common to form a very close 
relationship. This is demonstrated by the fact that the general public in the U.S. fears the creation 
of a G-2 between the U.S. and China, which is also shared by the scholar field, the White House, 
the Capitol, and the Pentagon. Most recently, while China and Russia had a good relationship 
and both of them are listed as the largest threat to the U.S., China is increasingly characterized as 
the enemy of America instead of by a more neutral term. In addition, China has not fully 
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complied with the rules of the WTO, nor has it abided by the Hague ruling under UNCLOS. The 
U.S. also believes that two countries are not bounded by the shared interests and identity because 
China has not fully accepted the post-World War II global order. 
 The change of rules or norms variable also explains some of U.S. threat perception of 
Chinese foreign policy. Because China has not abided by rules of existing rules of major 
traditional multilateral institutions, the U.S. deems the Chinese-led multilateral institutions and 
initiatives an institutional challenge to the existing rules or norms. The U.S. perceives that, by 
establishing new organizations, China became more provocative to the existing global order 
because it has made the transition from implicitly violating existing rules or norms to explicitly 
setting up and institutionalizing alternative rules or norms. Such a change stirs up the American 
perception of Chinese efforts in multilateral diplomacy and global governance.  
 The combined effect of the power, identity, and the change of rules or norms variables 
makes it more formidable than simply the addition of the influence of all three. Because of low 
transparency of the Chinese government, the lack of information even pushes the American 
threat perception of China even higher. The U.S. perception, however, could potentially fall into 
a few heuristic filters of misperceptions.  
Across dimensions, we can see that the American perception is mostly rooted in the 
power variable. Overemphasis on the power variable often leads to the danger of the security 
dilemma. If Washington only focuses on the rise of Chinese power and the reduction of the 
difference between American and Chinese power, that means that the structural threat of 
Thucydides’ Trap could be true. As the power variable has an almost disproportionately 
important weight in the function of the American threat perception, the threat of Thucydides’ 
Trap depends not only on the level of China’s power but also on whether the power variable will 
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continue to dictate the American perception. To escape from Thucydides’ Trap, on the one hand, 
the U.S. should take efforts to look beyond the power variable. The U.S. President and his 
cabinet should not be filled only with people who believe that capability shapes intention. China, 
on the other hand, should incentivize the U.S. to look at other variables by promoting 
opportunities for collaboration. 
Additionally, the American perception could potentially face the problem of cognitive 
dissonance. China has been historically part of the communist regime and currently in a good 
relationship with Russia, cognitive consistency should make the U.S. suspicious to any Chinese 
actions. What’s more dangerous, cognitive consistency could carry out to all dimensions. Even 
when China has benign intentions, the U.S. may not be able to fully understand its goodwill. 
 
III. Policy Prescriptions by Dimensions 
 As we have analyzed both the Chinese and American perceptions of the Chinese foreign 
policy, I will now provide solutions to major differences of both perceptions and their 
misperceptions by bilateral relations, multilateral diplomacy, security and military, and economic 
cooperation dimensions. I will give out several measures to lower threat perception of each other 
by providing confidence-building measures as well as crisis management mechanisms. Note, 
these policy prescriptions are provided as direct responses to my comparison and analysis that 
are based on the theoretical framework. None of these policies are easier to be done than said, as 
a lot of them face serious practical constraints. Nonetheless, if they could be implemented at 
some point, threat perception would be reduced by much. Thus, my focus in this section would 
be to inform readers what type of policies would reduce threat perceptions instead of what 
policies are most practical and easiest to implement.   
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Bilateral Relations 
 In China’s bilateral relations with foreign countries, the major difference between the 
American and Chinese perceptions is that, while China uses the power variable to explain its 
bilateral relations with stronger countries and the identity variable to explain its relations with 
weaker countries, the U.S. puts its full attention on China’s capacity. Given the difference, there 
are several ways to bring the expectation the American and Chinese perceptions together. 
1. In terms of U.S.-China relations, both countries should continue to deepen their 
commitments of major dialogue and communications mechanisms, including the four 
dialogues that President Trump and President Xi agreed on. Given that Sino-U.S. 
relations are facing escalated tensions, both the U.S. and China should ensure that timely 
communications through both formal and informal channels are always open.  
2. In terms of Sino-Russian relations, the U.S. should comprehend the Chinese perspective 
that a Sino-Russian alliance is unlikely to happen. Although certain rhetoric is employed 
by the U.S. to achieve its strategic ends, the U.S. should understand putting Russia and 
China in the same category is inaccurate. During the process of policy-making, U.S. 
officials should remind themselves of not treating China and Russia with the same 
measures. 
3. In terms of China’s relations with its neighbors and other developing countries, China 
should understand that the concerns of the United States. China should practice what it 
preaches and publicize what it has achieved. China should come up with a clear standard 
of its bilateral cooperation with these countries. Such a standard will provide more 
information to the rest of the world and score higher transparency. 
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Multilateral Diplomacy 
In the multilateral diplomacy dimension, the center of bilateral tensions is the change of 
rules or norms. The Chinese government believes that the BRICS, BRI, and AIIB are all 
additions to the existing global orders. Each of them speaks to a region or a group of countries 
whose interests were not properly represented in global institutions before. The BRICS 
represents the interests of emerging markets. BRI and AIIB promote economic integration and 
development to the Eurasian landmass where, to the west, there is the European Union, and to 
the east, there is NAFTA. The United States, however, believes that the China-led initiatives and 
institutions lower the standard of traditional multilateral institutions and even endanger core 
American interests. Given the problem, several policy recommendations are given below. 
1. Since China acknowledges that post-World War II global institutions are still the best 
institutions. Both China and the United States should facilitate global governance under 
the system of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and 
so on. Both countries should aim to protect and strengthen the traditional institutions. 
These institutions should continue to serve as the authority of international political, 
economic and security decision-making. 
2. New-coming regional and global institutions should be encouraged by the United States 
so long as it put all participants on an equal footing and does not violate core interests of 
traditional institutions. The U.S. should not deliberately hinder the efforts of emerging 
markets who strive to gain an appropriate representation in global institutions as their 
economies grow.  
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3. China should provide more opportunities and mechanisms through which the U.S. 
government or American organizations could either participate in or gain information 
about ongoing activities in China-led initiatives and institutions. China should be 
incentivized to provide necessary information in order to cancel out American concerns. 
4. Both the U.S. and China should cooperate at combating climate change, containing 
piracy activities, protecting environment and biodiversity, conducting humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief, and other global governance activities. In these fields, both 
countries have shared interests, and both have the responsibility to uphold these 
initiatives as the largest and second-largest economies and polities in the world. These 
initiatives will help formulate shared identity in global governance and reduce hostility. 
 
Security and Military 
 Unlike in other dimensions, both the U.S. and China focused a lot on the power and 
information variables in the perception framework. The danger of security and status dilemmas is 
imminent. To lower the threat perceptions and the risks of military confrontation, several 
measures are provided to achieve this end. 
1. Both the Chinese and American governments should be aware of the danger of security 
and status dilemmas. Two lessons should be drawn from the dilemmas. First, military 
leaders should not dictate the policy-making procedure of each government. This is 
especially important for the U.S. government as there have been several retired generals 
serving in the current administration. Second, both American and Chinese decision-
makers should always remember the shared stakes both countries have in global 
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governance and a healthy world economy in addition to the security interests they have. 
Focusing excessively on security would result in the danger of security dilemma. 
2. Direct Military and security dialogues at between both governments should continue to 
open. At the same time, more direct military-to-military hotline at lower level should be 
created under the legal permission of both countries.  
3. Since both countries agree that future military encounters are more likely to happen on 
the sea, both should start to establish a framework that allows future bilateral negotiations 
on a bilateral naval code of conduct that provides necessary guidance to future maritime 
encounters. Such a code of conduct helps to align the expectations of each other. 
4. In the most militarily hotly contested region, including the South China Sea and the 
Korean peninsula, both countries should understand the concerns of each other. Although 
both countries have vastly different interests, both should be self-restrained and 
understand that any defensive actions could be perceived offensively by the other. 
5. Both the U.S. and China should cooperate to face non-traditional maritime challenges 
such as anti-piracy, environmental degradation, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief 
missions across different oceans. Joint drills should be carried out when permissible. 
These activities will help both navies to formulate shared identity in peacekeeping 
missions around the world. 
 
Economic Engagement 
China believes that it shares the same identity and interests as a supporter of liberal 
global economic order. However, the U.S. does not see it the same way as China does. 
Apparently, there is a difference between how the U.S. and China think whether they have a 
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shared identity institutional-wise. For China, the shared identity means that both the U.S. and 
China could be better off by exploiting comparative advantages. Therefore, a win-win situation 
should come with economic cooperation. For the U.S., a shared identity as supporters of global 
free trade is more pertinent to the institutional arrangement. Especially after President Trump 
came into office, the U.S. has become much more dissatisfied with China’s domestic economic 
and institutional reform. In January 2018, the U.S. trade representative even vocally stated that 
having China joined WTO in 2001 is a mistake.222 In a few months, the U.S. and China have 
started a trade war. Such a difference could not be solved in a day. In order to ease tensions and 
achieve a win-win situation that is acceptable to both, below are some solutions.  
1. In line with President Xi Jinping’s speech at 2018 Bo’ao Asia Forum, China should 
continue to liberalize its economy by lower tariffs in accordance with WTO, allowing 
foreign capital to enter Chinese markets that do not endanger national security, and 
enforcing the protection of property rights.  
2. The Trump Administration should restrain itself from developing limited trade conflicts 
into an all-out economic war. Such a result may resonate with domestic political 
supporters in the short run. Nonetheless, the long run costs are not bearable for either the 
United States or China.  
3. Both countries should continue to use official dialogues developed during the Xi-Trump 
meeting at Mar-a-Lago in April 2017. The comprehensive economic dialogue should 
serve a more important role than what it is. Both countries should continue to send 
delegates to each other’s in order to achieve timely communications. 
																																																						
222 Shawn Donnan, "Subscribe to the FT to Read: Financial Times US Says China WTO Membership Was a 
Mistake," Financial Times, January 19, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/edb346ec-fd3a-
11e7-9b32-d7d59aace167.  
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4. Both countries should seek economic cooperation outside China and the United States. 
Economic cooperation at the international level could certainly help lower bilateral 
economic tensions. Diplomatically, China should continue to invite the United States to 
join AIIB. Practically, China should try to invite some major American firms to 
participate and bid in some BRI projects. Both will help to show an open attitude of 
China to the United States. 
 
To reiterate, all these policy suggestions above are simplistic compared to real situations. 
However, they serve as examples of what types of policies are able to lower threat perception 
and understand the perspective of each other better for both the United States and China. 
Admittedly, the gap between the American and Chinese perceptions is large, and U.S.-China 
relations is currently on a trajectory that is likely to worsen in the imminent future. Nonetheless, 
the policymakers in both countries should strive to create necessary conditions to implement 
appropriate policies to bring in the gap and form better U.S.-China relations. Only in doing so, a 
more harmonious global society would ever be possible to come into realization.  
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